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In the past few years, there has been a large push towards adapting traditional 
industrial manipulators to other, more consumer-centric applications [1].  These include 
not only house and elderly care, but also towards medical applications that manipulators 
may be especially suited for, such as rehabilitation of patients who have suffered 
neurological trauma [2].  Impeding this push are the strict safety requirements necessary 
to certify a manipulator for use.  These requirements include low speed operation and 
preventing humans from entering the manipulator workspace [3].  These restrictions 
effectively prevent a manipulator from being used in many of these applications. 
Previous work done in manipulator safety research has focused on improving the 
system’s knowledge of its environment and controlling the manipulator’s motion to keep 
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away from potential hazards.  These methods are extremely important in terms of 
avoiding potential collisions but provide little insight into the situation that occurs once a 
hazard occurs and the manipulator is forced to react. 
In order to improve upon the ability to evaluate a manipulator’s overall safety, 
this report establishes a framework to evaluate the capacity of a manipulator to safely 
“halt” itself.  Two sets of criteria are presented in this report.  The first set seeks to 
quantify both the potential of the manipulator to avoid a collision during the stopping 
motion and the potential severity of the collision.  The second set of criteria quantifies the 
effect of the stopping motion at the actuator level, allowing the operator to identify 
potential hardware faults and the capacity to which the actuators are performing.  A 
framework for mapping the manipulator’s actuator parameters for the gear reduction ratio 
and the motor torque to the potential safety criteria performance is formulated to allow 
the manipulator designer to match task requirements to the manipulator design. 
Finally, an examination of the effects on operating parameters such as 
manipulator configuration, end-effector load, and operating speed is presented with a 
6DOF industrial manipulator.  This analysis showed that the operating speed of the 
manipulator is the most important determinant of the safety performance, with the 
distance traveled by the manipulator increasing by a factor of 15 for all configurations 
when the speed is increased only by a factor of four.  Recommendations for the 
application of these criteria are presented to the reader as well. 
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In the past few years, a large push in robotics and robotic manipulators has been 
to expand their uses beyond the traditional industrial, assembly-line usage into areas such 
as household assistance for the elderly, consumer services [1] and rehabilitation for 
medical patients who have suffered neurological trauma [2].  As these systems move 
closer towards humans, a greater emphasis on providing safe systems is necessary to 
certify these for use by American safety standards.  Currently, ANSI/RIA safety 
standards require that any humans be located either outside the manipulator’s workspace, 
or onerous restrictions are placed upon manipulator operations when a human is located 
inside the workspace including slow speed operation, use of a teach pendant, presence of 
only one person inside the manipulator’s workspace, safeguarding circuits, and extensive 
training of the person present inside the manipulator’s workspace. Additional 
requirements include completely avoiding the manipulator’s path while in the workspace. 
[3] This effectively precludes the use of manipulators from being used in the home or in 
medical applications in the US since the training and infrastructure required to certify a 
manipulator is infeasible to support their use in these potential new applications. 
In order to begin to relax these restrictions, a better framework to evaluate the 
capacity of serial manipulators to “halt” themselves is needed.  While there are many 
aspects to the overall safety of the system, including hazard detection and hazard 
response time, this report focuses on providing a method for assessing the safety of a 
manipulator’s motion once the command to respond to a hazard is received by the 
manipulator and stopping torques are applied to the system. 
2 
 
This chapter first gives an overview of the problem and proceeds to outline the 
modeling geometry of serial manipulators and the basic concepts of joint space path 
planning.  A short discussion of the dynamics of serial manipulators is also presented.  
The final section provides a summary of the work presented throughout the rest of the 
report. 
1.1 PROBLEM OVERVIEW 
While there have been previous attempts to quantify the safety of a manipulator, 
these often focus solely on measuring the effects of impacts with humans, with human-
care manipulators [4], or on the overall reliability of the system due to various faults [5, 
6].  Very little work has been done to either develop a generic measure of the safety of 
the system, or to quantify the degree to which the system is performing to its capacity 
during a stopping trajectory. In order to establish this framework, two separate conditions 
must be satisfied. 
1.1.1 Physical Meaning 
Any criteria developed must be useful to an operator without requiring a large 
amount of additional analysis.  Without a clear understanding of what each criterion 
means with respect to the physical reality of the system, adoption and use of the criteria 
will naturally be limited.  Particularly within the internal workings of the manipulator 
model, there are easily derivable analytical measurements to quantify the performance of 
the manipulator, but many of these analytics are unable to be easily explained as 
observable quantities to the operator.  Thus, a slightly more complicated analytic 
calculation that is more easily translatable to a physical phenomenon may be of more use 
to the operator than one easily derived from the manipulator’s equations of motion.  This 
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principle is loosely based on the work of Mark Tisius explaining the physical meaning of 
manipulator performance criteria. [7] 
Particularly as robots move outside of not just highly controlled industrial 
environments and into more uncontrolled consumer environments, this will become more 
of an issue.  An expansion of the robotic market will result in more manipulators 
operating outside of the purview of highly skilled and educated robotic technicians, so the 
available metrics need to be easily accessible to operators with limited robotic 
experience.  While a metric based simply on the determinant of the Jacobian may be 
easily understood by an operator with experience in manipulator analysis, it will be 
essentially meaningless to the target market.  Given that the end users are the individuals 
most affected by the safety of the manipulator in terms of their capacity for either 
economic loss or personal injury due to hazards, their capacity to quickly grasp the risks 
associated with a system is of paramount importance. 
1.1.2 Safety-Capacity Criteria Conflicts 
With two metrics at odds with each other, conflicts will naturally occur.  A set of 
system level criteria defined to maximize safety performance of the system will oppose 
criteria defined to measure the degree to which the manipulator is performing to its 
capacity.  The operator and designer will seek to extract the maximum performance from 
the manipulator in order to provide the safest stopping motion possible.  At the same 
time, it is desired to operate the actuators at the lowest percentage of capacity as possible 
in order to prevent internal faults and excessive loading of the system.  A system 
operating at peak performance will necessarily be operating at the capacity of its 
individual components, so the operator will have to balance these competing desires 
according to the individual task and safety requirements of the manipulator. 
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1.2 MANIPULATOR MODELING 
In order to develop a meaningful understanding of the stopping motion of serial 
manipulators, it is important to start with a framework for the geometric analysis of 
manipulators.  Most of the internal capacity criteria are developed somewhat based on 
these modeling concepts.  These modeling techniques are laid out more thoroughly in 
Thomas and Tesar. [8] The compliance and stiffness models are described as in 
Hernandez and Tesar. [9] 
1.2.1 Kinematics Model 
The robot kinematics model is based upon a mapping of input parameters to 
output parameters.  This is done through a set of generalized influence coefficients.  
Through the use of this generalization, the model can be extended to include all 
manipulators of varying complexity, from simple planar, overconstrained systems to 
complex, manipulators with a high degree of redundancy. 
These influence components map a set of input parameters to output parameters, 
so the input and output space must be defined.  In theory, joints can be either rotational or 
prismatic, but to maintain a degree of simplicity in the equations of motion, the input 
parameters are all described in terms of a rotational value, as most manipulators comprise 
primarily rotational joints.  However, this is easily adapted to account for prismatic joints 
as well, with only the notation being different.  This makes the input vector for a 
manipulator containing n joints an nx1 vector. 
    , , … ,        (1.1) 
This vector is a function of time, so the input joint velocities and accelerations are 
defined as the first and second time derivatives respectively. 
   , , … ,        (1.2) 
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   , , … ,        (1.3) 
The output parameters are the Cartesian location and orientation of the end-
effector.  While many different representations of the end-effector orientation exist, for 
the concern of this report, the orientation will be represented as the rotation about each of 
the three principle axes, denoted by the subscripts following the angle.  The variables x, 
y, and z represent the Cartesian location, and the rotations ψx, ψy, and ψz represent the 
three orientation parameters. 
  , , , , , , , , , ,        (1.4) 
Due to the high degree of coupling in serial manipulators, each of the output 
parameters is a function of the input parameters, therefore, u is a function of the input 
parameters as follows. 
    
, , … ,
, , … ,
, , … ,
, , … ,
, , … ,
, , … ,
            (1.5) 
1.2.1.2 First Order Influence Coefficients 
As developed in Thomas and Tesar [8], the first order influence coefficients, or G 
functions, allows the mapping of the time derivatives of the input parameters to the 
output parameters.  These coefficients are defined in such a way that they are functions of 
the current geometry of the system only.  Letting u represent the output position of the 
manipulator, the derivation can be seen in equation 1.6. 
 
            (1.6) 
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Here,  represents the matrix containing the first order influence equations, 
and as can be clearly seen, is entirely a function of the input parameters.  Each individual 
G-function relates a single input joint velocity to a single output velocity.  The full matrix 
of G-functions can be seen as in equation 1.7. 
 




        (1.7) 
While the most general set of G-functions will map the input parameters to the 
end-effector position, this is not a requirement.  G-functions can be used to map the 
location of any fixed point on the manipulator to the input parameters.  This is often 
useful in dynamics calculations to account for the weight and gravity shift of the links.  
For the special case of the G-functions mapping to the end-effector location, however, the 
matrix of G-functions is referred to as the Jacobian. 
 
1.2.1.3 Second Order Influence Coefficients 
Mapping input accelerations to output accelerations is also important not only in 
dynamic analysis, but especially in terms of stopping analysis where the ability to quickly 
decelerate is of paramount importance to the safety of the manipulator.  This mapping is 
found by taking the second time derivative of the position vector. 
 
        (1.8) 
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Each of these terms represent distinct components of the acceleration.  The G-
functions are still present to map the joint accelerations to the output accelerations, 
representing the “tangential” components of the output acceleration.  The term, , 
refers to the second order influence coefficients, and, similar to the G-functions, is solely 
a function of the geometry of the system.  These are grouped into a tensor here 
commonly known as the Hessian.  The Hessian contains both the contributions of the 
centripetal accelerations, represented by the diagonal terms in the Hessian, and the 
coriolis acceleration, represented by the off-diagonal terms.  The Hessian is an nx6xn 
tensor for a spatial manipulator with n joints, with 6 referring to the number of output 
parameters. 
1.2.2 Dynamics Model 
The entire dynamics model is thoroughly defined in Thomas and Tesar [8] but is 
briefly described here.  First, in order to determine the dynamic torques required to 
accelerate the manipulator, the effective inertia matrix is defined based upon the mass, 
Mjk, and effective inertia, Π
jk, for each link jk in the manipulator. 
 
  ∑ Π       (1.9) 
The matrix  is the matrix of G-functions for the location of the center of 
gravity of the j-th joint and is a result of the parallel-axis theorem transforming the inertia 
of the link to a location other than its center of gravity.   represents the simple G-
function mapping to the location of the axis origin. 
Next, the inertial power matrix must be calculated to determine the total dynamic 
torques required.  This incorporates the centripetal and Coriolis inertial loads by 







    (1.10) 
 
The variable P  is the inertia tensor for each link, and the  operator represents 
the generalized dot product. 
With these two matrices calculated, the dynamic torque can be calculated using 
Eq. 1.11 below. 
  ∑ ,     (1.11) 
The last two terms in the summation refer to the static gravity and end-effector 
loads.  is the set of G-functions mapping the input parameters to the center of 
gravity of link j, and  is the set of G-functions mapping to the end-effector for the 
jth-link.  The two L terms refer to the gravity loads for each link and the end-effector 
load, respectively. 
1.2.3 Compliance Model 
Stiffness is a concern on two levels for safety applications, albeit in two opposing 
ways.  First, a stiffer system is a more precise system, allowing the operator to have a 
greater confidence in the location of the end-effector.  However, a stiffer system will tend 
to transfer a greater amount of energy to the source of a collision in the case of a safety 
hazard than a more compliant system will since some of the energy in the collision will 
be elastically absorbed by the deflection in the manipulator. 
This makes an accurate compliance model important to the designer and operator.  
The compliance model used in this report is developed in Hernandez and Tesar [8], but is 
briefly summarized here.  First, a few assumptions are made in the model: 
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 Small deformations 
 Rotational displacements treated as vectors 
 Superposition is valid 
 Elasticity is linear 
 Small deflections so that geometry is not altered 
First, deflections at the node are described by the following vector 1.12.  
  Δ Δ , , Δ , , Δ , , Δ , , Δ , , Δ ,        (1.12) 
The small deflection assumption means that the rotational displaces can be treated 
as a single vector, so most of these terms can be ignored.  The loading at each node can 
be defined as in Eq. 1.13. 
  L F , , F , , F , , M , , M , , M ,        (1.13) 
The stiffness matrix forms the basis for the model and allows these quantities to 










       (1.14) 
 
The stiffness matrix relates the displacements at one axis to the force at another. 
This can also be transformed using G-functions to another coordinate system. 
Because most deflection occurs at the joint axes due to the weight of the 
manipulator and end-effector loads, which would be the effective result in a collision, this 
model can be greatly simplified.  Compliance for each axis can be transformed from the 




   C           (1.15) 
 
Here, C  is the deflection per unit torque of the joint in the rotational direction 
of the axis, and the model is simplified to assume that deflection in other directions at the 
joint is negligible.  This simplified model results in C  being represented as a diagonal 
matrix.  While other terms can be included at the discretion of the operator, there is a 
quick increase in complexity from the addition of deflections in other axis directions. 
1.2.4 Other Gain Functions 
1.2.4.1 Actuator Gain Functions 
In actual robotic systems, the actuators used often operate at a torque/speed ratio 
not ideal for use in serial manipulators.  This is rectified in mechanical systems through 
use of a gear ratio.  Since G-functions are defined as any mapping of an input to an 
output, this is a special case of G-functions for a 1-DOF system, and is defined in this 
case as the inverse of the gear reduction ratio.  This is simply the ratio of the output joint 
speed to the input actuator speed.  Because of the simplicity of a 1-DOF transmission 
speed, this is easily determined.  For a gear train reduction of 50:1, the G-function, , is 
equal to 0.02.  This G-function is also defined as the inverse of the mechanical advantage 
of the joint.   
Gear ratios also have the advantage of improving torque capacity and stiffness of 
the system.  An improved torque capacity leads to increased responsiveness and 
acceleration capacity in the system since torque is nearly linearly related to acceleration.  
Improved stiffness allows for a greater accuracy in system operation because any position 
error due to low stiffness of the rotor (the main source of compliance as described 
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previously in Section 1.2.3) being scaled down by the mechanical advantage. This total 
effect of gear trains upon joint parameters is described in Benedict and Tesar [10] 
While there is no absolute requirement that gear trains used in robotic 
manipulators be speed reducers, in practice this is almost always the case.  This refers to 
the case 0,1 , with 0 representing an infinite mechanical gain which is 
impossible to achieve given real world mechanical limits.  The case, 1, refers to a 
direct-drive (non-geared) joint where prime movers are connected directly to the links 
without transmission through a gear train. 
An additional assumption used in this work, although not necessarily required, is 
that all actuators are 1-DOF and the gear trains transmit motion purely through rotary 
means.  While multiple DOF actuators such as ball joints may be used in manipulators, 
the analysis framework is established such that these may be modeled as separate 1-DOF 
joints located at the same axis. 
Figure 1.1: Transformations the actuator parameters undergo between motor space and 
task space [Rios, 2008] 
 
Because of the common traits of g-functions, they are easily combined to create 
the complete transformation from actuator space to Cartesian, or task space, as in Eq. 
1.16. 




The set of manipulator G-functions, , are the system parameters mapping the 
joint space to the output space and  is the set of all actuator transformations.  This 
simple product allows for transformation of the actuator parameters into a useful form for 
the designer and operator. 
1.2.4.2 Effective Distance 
Another useful metric used to describe the manipulator G-functions is the 
effective distance, Li, This represents the equivalent distance from the end-effector of the 
manipulator to joint i.  It represents the equivalent analogue to the moment arm between a 
load and the driving actuator in a 1-DOF system.  A derivation is included in Rios [11], 
but is shown here to illustrate the concept as well. 




The Jacobian, as previously described, relates the input parameters to the output 
position and orientation of the manipulator.  Because this matrix contains both position 
and orientation parameters, it can be deconstructed into these two components, that is, the 
a 3xn matrix containing the mapping of input parameters to the end-effector position, and 
a 3xn matrix containing the mapping of input parameters to the end-effector orientation.  
This decomposition is shown in Eq. 1.17. 
               (1.17) 
 Here, , and . φ represents the input joint positions.  This 
eliminates the unit discrepancy that inherently exists in a manipulator comprising entirely 
rotary joints.  Since the joint velocities have dimensions of rad/sec, the elements of JT 
must have units of length in order for dimensional requirements to be satisfied and the 
elements of  must be dimensionless. 
 As a further simplification, it has been shown in Thomas and Tesar [8] that the 
columns of JT can be determined simply through Eq. 1.18. 
              (1.18) 
Here, si represents a unit vector pointing along the axis of motion for joint i, or along the 
z-axis of joint i in traditional manipulator modeling, pi is a 3x1 vector representing the 
location of the origin of the i-th axis with respect to the base frame, and P is a 3x1 vector 
representing the location of the end-effector with respect to the base frame.  This 
geometry can be seen in Figure 1.3 as well.  The result is that  is the location of 
the origin of the i-th axis with respect to the end-effector and the effective distance, Li,  is 
defined as in Eq. 1.19.  
             (1.19) 
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The norm, · , denotes the standard Euclidean or 2-norm.  In the most basic form, 
this represents the manipulator gain between the i-th joint and the end-effector, which 
will then combine in a product with the mechanical gain from the actuator’s gear train.  
For planar manipulators as shown in Figure 1.3, the axis si will always be perpendicular 
to the vector , so the effective distance will always be equal to the simple, 
measurable distance between the joint and the end-effector. 
1.3 TRAJECTORY PLANNING 
There is a large body of work done solely on the work of optimizing trajectories for 
1-DOF.  This work is thoroughly summarized in Rajan [12] although a short examination 
of different trajectory generation strategies is presented here. 
Joint space planning involves ignoring the end-effector motion during path planning 
and instead treating the joints as independent 1-DOF systems and computing a smooth 
trajectory to satisfy initial and final conditions.  This typically involves a slow ramp up to 
a maximum velocity or acceleration, followed by a ramp down to a zero velocity at the 
end of the trajectory. 
This type of motion planning is typically used in active stops due its simplicity of 
calculation and the inherent importance of slowing the entire system as quickly as 
possible during the trajectory.  Since a stopping trajectory will not be complete until each 
joint is motionless (hazards could still occur even during self-motion of the manipulator), 
this allows the stopping motion to be completed as quickly as possible. 
Also, by generating smooth trajectories for each of the actuators’ paths, motion 
planning in joint space allows for the minimal possibility of errors within the hardware or 
joint faults.  During the stopping trajectory, the actuators will already be operating near or 
above their operating limits, so by mitigating the potential for large changes in 
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commanded torque with a smooth trajectory, there will be fewer mechanical faults and 
required repairs in the manipulator.   
The disadvantage from using joint space motion planning is the lack of control over 
motion of the end-effector.  This is a large concern during regular control of the 
manipulator because the end-effector’s path is undetermined between the initial and final 
positions.  Since these concerns are not present during stopping motions, and because of 
the advantages described above, joint space motion planning will be used to demonstrate 
the stopping motion and evaluate the stopping criteria in this work. 
Three separate joint space motion planning schemes will be discussed briefly here: 
polynomial, sinusoidal, and trapezoidal.  These are some of the more popular joint space 
motion planning methods, and the methodology and relative advantages and 
disadvantages of each are shown here. 
1.3.1 Cosine Trajectory 
Cosine, or sinusoidal, motion planning involves the generation of trajectories 
based on trigonometric functions.  Since all trigonometric functions are differentiable and 
integral, these functions will lead to an inherently smooth trajectory.  However, there are 
still non-zero initial and final accelerations in the system, which will introduce 
undesirable shocks to the system, which have the potential to damage actuators and/or 
gear trains. 
The equations that define the total motion for a cosine trajectory are described in 
Eq. 1.20, and example plots of the trajectory can be seen in Figure 1.4. 
 
    
0.5 1 cos 
0.5 sin 
0.5 cos 
          (1.20) 
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Figure 1.4: Plots of sample cosine trajectories. [March, 2004] 
 
1.3.2 Polynomial Trajectory 
Polynomial motion planning is a more general methodology than cosine motion 
planning because it encompasses more possibilities.  In general, however, a polynomial 
motion plan is one that consists of the output parameter being represented as a 
polynomial using time as the independent variable.  This can allow for the elimination of 
non-zero initial acceleration shocks simply by using a 3-4-5 polynomial.  The name 
derives from the final exponents of the position vector.  Any degree of complexity can be 
added by expanding the polynomial or increasing it to higher orders.  However, as higher 
orders get added, it becomes more difficult to physically execute the trajectory in 
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practice, even if the trajectory may be of equal difficulty to compute in theory.  The 
equations of motion for this trajectory are shown in Eq. 1.21. 
 




          (1.21) 
The trajectories calculated by these equations are shown below in figure 1.5. 
Figure 1.5: Plots of sample polynomial trajectories [March, 2004] 
 
As can be seen, this trajectory has the advantage of beginning and ending 
accelerations of zero, minimizing the initial and final shocks present in the trajectories. 
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While 3-4-5 polynomials demonstrate one form of polynomial motion planning, 
different methods such as the cubic polynomials used in Bazaz and Tondu [15] can also 
be used, demonstrating the different approaches that can be used. 
1.3.3 Trapezoidal Trajectory 
Trapezoidal motion planning is the final motion planning algorithm here and is 
extremely useful in generating smooth trajectories.  This method defines one of the 
derivatives of the output parameters as a trapezoidal curve using piece-wise linear 
singularity functions.  This is done by defining the break points for the trapezoids in the 
motion plan.  This is shown in figure 1.6, where , , … ,  are the breakpoints in the 
trajectory.  The location of the break points creates the linear functions for the trapezoidal 
trajectory. 
Figure 1.6: Example trapezoidal trajectory [March, 2004] 
 
The derivative that the trapezoidal trajectory is located in is known as the order of 
the motion plan.  For example, a trapezoidal trajectory in the acceleration space would be 
a 2nd order motion plan and a trapezoid in the jerk space would be considered a 3rd order 
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motion plan.  Because the trajectory is a set of linear functions, it is integral despite being 
piece-wise, so the lower order outputs are then determined through integration of the 
original trajectory.  Higher order motion plans will result in smoother trajectories, but 
will introduce more unpredictable higher order effects similar to the polynomial or 
sinusoidal motion plans. 
A complete methodology for determining the necessary breakpoints and trapezoid 
amplitudes given a set of initial and final conditions was defined in Tesar and Matthew 
[15].  This methodology allows the operator to easily adjust the trapezoidal amplitude and 
overall motion plan by adjusting the break points, , , … , , for a given trajectory. 




Figure 1.7 shows an example of a 2nd order trapezoidal motion plan.  The 
algorithm has the requirements of an initial and final acceleration built in to minimize 
shocks, and smooth trajectories are generated in both the velocity and position space.  
While the discontinuities in the acceleration motion profile will still result in small 
shocks to the system, these can be smoothed out at the cost of generating some higher 
order effects by creating the trapezoidal plan in a 3rd or higher order. 
The equations used to generate the above plots are shown below in Eq. 1.22 and 
1.23.  Eq. 1.22 is the equation for the actual equation for the i-th derivative of an n-th 






          (1.22) 
      (1.23) 
1.3.4 Trajectory Comparison 
Tesar and Mathew [15] developed a set of five criteria to evaluate the desirability 
of single DOF motion curves as shown above.  This analysis will not be repeated here, 
but the analysis showed that the trapezoidal motion plan contains a set of desirable 
properties, including a being completely general up to the n-th order and the easy shaping 
and modification of the motion plan by simply moving the break points. 
Due to the conclusions presented in that report, a trapezoidal motion plan is used 
to generate the sample stopping trajectories in this work, to optimize the trajectory 
according to legacy work. 
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1.4 DOCUMENT OUTLINE 
The rest of this report is divided as follows.  Chapter 2 presents a review of previous 
work done in the field of manipulator safety.  This includes not only attempts to evaluate 
the safety of a manipulator during operation, but also the work done in order to integrate 
safety into the system and ensure early detection of hazards.  A brief review of the work 
done to estimate manipulator capabilities given actuator parameters is included here as 
well. 
Chapter 3 presents the formulation and explanation of the safety criteria in this 
report, including descriptions of their physical and analytical meanings.  Criteria to 
measure both the safety performance of the manipulator and the degree to which the 
manipulator is performing at its capacity are both included here.  Finally, a simple case 
study is presented to the reader to demonstrate the use of the criteria and how to interpret 
the results. 
Chapter 4 provides an analysis of how the designer can satisfy different task safety 
requirements given the actuator parameters.  This allows the designer to map actuator 
parameters to potential safety performance of the manipulator and ensure that proper 
choices are made so that the final system will meet the task requirements.   
Chapter 5 presents a 6DOF case study applying the safety criteria developed in 
previous chapters to a common industrial system that should be familiar to the reader.  












This section is meant to provide an overview of research that has been done in the 
general field of safety. These include assessing the potential injuries resulting from 
collisions, incorporating different environmental monitoring systems to prevent 
collisions, and assessing the safety state of the manipulator during operation.  In addition, 
section on capability estimation is included to provide a framework for the estimation of 
the stopping performance based upon actuator parameters. 
2.1 SAFETY RESEARCH 
Since robots were first conceived, they’re capacity to harm humans has been a 
concern.  This was originally conceptualized with Isaac Asimov’s three laws of robotics 
first written in 1942. Specifically, human safety is addressed in the first law which states 
“A robot may not injure a human being, or through inaction, cause a human being to 
come to harm”. [16] While this considered largely the case of autonomous humanoid 
robots, it illustrates the primary requirement for safety that has driven and constrained all 
robotic systems, including industrial and mobile systems. 
Research into developing safe systems has been conducted in four separate areas. 
First, researchers have worked on developing an improved awareness of the environment 
through greater sensor or camera fusion in order to improve safety.  As computing power 
has increased rapidly over the past two decades, the ability of manipulator controllers (PC 
or embedded) to process data has increased similarly.  This has led to more systems 
utilizing real-time data to gauge the state of their environments rather than the standard 
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industrial system of maintaining a strictly constant manipulator workspace and operating 
the manipulator under the assumption of a static environment. 
Second, work has been done to develop mechanical solutions to minimize the 
impact of collisions.  These include developing selectively compliant joints [17], using 
soft materials to lessen the impact [4], and the use of hybrid actuators [18]. This allows 
for the creation of an inherently safer system under any control strategy due to the 
lessened potential in the case of collision with a human. 
Third, researchers have attempted to map the system parameters and state of the 
manipulator at the moment of impact to the potential for injury in a human [19, 20].  This 
is vitally important work to be done in order to reassess safety standards allowing use of 
robots in physical Human-Robot Interaction (pHRI) applications.  In order to certify a 
manipulator for use in an environment, the maximum potential injury must be known.  
With a standard methodology for mapping the manipulator’s operating specifications to 
injury potential, an operator can easily determine the safety of a manipulator in a task 
simply from the manipulator’s data sheet. 
Finally, work has been done to establish criteria to measure the “safeness” of a 
manipulator during standard operation and control strategies to optimize the 
manipulator’s motion according to these criteria in order to prevent collisions.  These 
include designing optimal braking strategies [21] in addition to more standard feedback 
control strategies [22, 23].  These studies tend to focus on establishing a single criterion 
evaluating the overall safety of the manipulator and application of that criterion rather 
than developing an overall framework for evaluation.  Additionally, they should be 
considered distinct from this work because the emphasis is largely on evaluating the 
safety of the manipulator during normal operation before a collision is detected or a stop 
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command is received while this report focuses on evaluating the safety of a manipulator 
by its ability to stop itself after the command has been received by the system. 
Improving the overall safety of manipulators and advancing towards a situation 
where manipulators are considered safe enough to incorporate pHRI tasks will 
incorporate all four of these approaches.  A short summary of the work being done in 
each follows. 
2.1.1 Environment Monitoring 
The most intuitive form of environmental monitoring is done with integrated 
camera systems feeding back vision information to the manipulator controller.  This 
technology has progressed to the point of being commercially available in systems like 
Pilz Automation’s SafetyEye [24].  This system, though, is limited largely to the 
replacement of traditional robot safeguards meant to keep unexpected hazards out of the 
manipulator workspace such as light curtains, guard gates and other barriers.  This makes 
it of limited use to improving manipulator safety since the net effect is to swap one set of 
controls for  a less invasive control system that has the exact same functionality. 
Alternatively, the use of fisheye cameras to track humans and other objects 
throughout the manipulator workspace has been investigated by Cervera et al. [25].  This 
improves upon the system by allowing for real-time tracking of motion within the 
manipulator’s space.  By covering the entirety of the manipulator’s workspace with 
visual input from several cameras, the operator can ensure that all potential motion is 
detected.  Cervera was able to demonstrate the vision system’s ability to not only detect a 
human entering the work space, but also to have a manipulator react to said human, in the 
demonstration, moving towards the human.  This obstacle data could then be applied to 
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any obstacle avoidance or collision detection strategy such as the models developed by 
Harden [26] in order to improve the overall safety of the system. 
Figure 2.1: Sample fisheye camera image under different illuminations [Cervera et al, 
2008] 
 
Another form of improved environment detection involves the work done by 
Jeong and Takahashi [21] in the development of a flexible Air Pressure Collision 
Detection System (APCS).  This is a flexible sensor allowing a collision to be detected 
before a rigid body is impacted by the manipulator in order to improve the response time 
of the manipulator.  A schematic is shown below. 
Figure 2.2:  a) Basic structure of an APCS, b) Tube type APCS [Jeong and Takahashi, 
2009] 
 
While this does not provide real time information about the environment to the 
manipulator, it improves the manipulator’s early detection of objects in its environment 
in a non-destructive manner.  Initial tests done show that the sensor has an extremely fast 
response time, on the order of a single millisecond, allowing the manipulator to detect a 
collision early and implement a stopping strategy before any serious damage is done to 
either the collision source (which may be a human) or the manipulator itself.  As with any 
26 
 
local sensor, however, this will be limited to detecting impacts at the sensor itself, and so 
implementation of these on a large scale manipulator may add a higher degree of 
complexity than a camera system which is independent of the manipulator chosen. 
2.1.2 Mechanically Safe Joints 
This approach to safe manipulators involves replacing the typically highly rigid, 
stiff joints and links, with softer, more compliant joint technology in order to minimize 
the damage that the manipulator can cause by transferring energy into the collision 
hazard.  Because stiffness is highly desirable in manipulators in order to improve the 
precision and responsiveness of the system, this often involves the use of selectively 
compliant actuators, such as in the work done by Shin et al. [18].  Here, the work done 
incorporates both pneumatic and electrical actuators in order to take advantage of the 
natural compressibility of air in the pneumatic actuators to make the system more 
compliant.  In order to provide precise motion, the more accurate, stiffer, electrical 
actuators are used for small-scale motion. 
Figure 2.3: Block Diagram of hybrid pneumatic-electric joint. The macro is a large-
scale pneumatic actuator while the mini is a smaller electric actuator [Shinn 
et. al, 2008] 
 
In Ikuta et al. [4], the effects of covering a manipulator with soft materials is 
examined.  A sample diagram of this is shown in fig 2.4. 
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Figure 2.4: Manipulator covered in soft material [Ikuta et al, 2003] 
 
This effectively increases the safety by removing some of the energy in the 
collision through absorption on the material coating.  This effect is represented by the 
spring-damper model used to model the soft material.  The amount of energy transferred 
from the manipulator to the environment can then be determined through the equations of 
damped oscillation, which have been thoroughly investigated.  Preliminary investigations 
done in that work show that simply covering a manipulator with a 10mm thick layer of 
rubber can significantly increase the safety, according to some metrics. 
A third hybrid actuation approach involves the work done by Rabindran [17].  
Rather than use inherently compliant actuators such as pneumatics or hydraulics, a multi-
stage gear train is used to dissipate energy from the system in the case of a sudden shock, 
allowing the joint to become fully compliant, effectively.  This work, while still fairly 
new, has the potential to greatly improve manipulator safety, simply by allowing for this 
degree of compliance while still maintaining a stiff system to allow for the manipulator to 
still be used in applications requiring a degree of precision.  The trade-off for the designer 
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is an added complexity that leads to more potential failure points, and an increased cost.  
This is mitigated by the simpler control strategy required than for pneumatic-electric 
hybrid systems, which require both actuators to be in the control loop to complete any 
motion. 
2.1.3 Injury Potential 
In order to determine level of potential injury manipulators can cause in a 
collision, Haddadin et. al did some empirical tests of collisions [19, 20].  A standardized 
measure of injury potential needed to be included, however, in order to standardize the 
measurements and convert from measurements of impact upon a dummy into meaningful 
assessment of the effect upon humans. Used in their work is Head Impact Criterion 
(HIC), a metric first used in automobile crash tests [14].  HIC is defined in Eq. 2.1 below. 
 
  Δ Δ
/
1000         (2.1) 
 Here,  refers to the resulting acceleration of the subject’s head after impact.  An 
HIC value below 650 represents a very low risk of injury as a point of reference.  While 
this criterion is useful for offline determination of the injury risk during certification, the 
fact that it requires measurement of the subject’s resulting motion makes it completely 
infeasible to be used as an evaluation of manipulator motion. 
 Through a set of empirical tests using dummies, Haddadin et. al was able to show 
that the primary factor in determining the HIC of a resultant impact was the impact 
velocity.  As manipulator mass increased, the HIC quickly saturated for a given velocity.  
Since the impact velocity is a controllable trajectory variable, this bodes well for the 
potential to greatly improve the potential for injury, at the very least according to HIC. 
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 In order to fully determine the safety of the system, Haddadin also measured the 
impact force relative to the fracture force for head collisions.  This involved a more 
complicated model of the human head, including differences in the fracture forces for the 
various bone sections of the cranium.  Shown below in figure 2.5 is the head model used, 
with the variable fracture forces shown in table 2.1. 
Figure 2.5: Anatomy of the Human Skull [Haddadin et al, 2008] 
 
Table 2.1: Facial Impact tolerance of cadaver heads [Haddadin et al, 2008] 
Facial Bone Fracture Force (kN) 
Mandible (A-P) 1.78 
Mandible (lateral) 0.89 
Maxilla 0.66 
Zygoma 0.89 




The described tests seem to imply that manipulators are effectively safe as long as 
the operating velocity is kept below maximum speed below which an impact forces and 
HIC injury potential would be below injury threshold. However, a study conducted at the 
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same time by Haddadin et al [20] involving constrained impacts showed a much higher 
potential for injury.  A constrained, or “clamped” impact refers to an impact where the 
subject’s resulting motion is limited, usually by a wall, but potentially by any fixed 
object.  This is compared to the unconstrained impacts described in their first work where 
the subject is free to move after impact. 
For the case of constrained impact, it was shown that, contrary to the 
unconstrained situation, the manipulator’s weight had a large impact on the potential for 
injury in the subject.  Table 2.2 shows their calculated impact forces for clamped 
collisions to demonstrate how great the forces generated in clamped collisions are.  It 
should be noted that 2 m/s was shown to be a safe operating speed during the analysis of 
unconstrained collisions. 
Table 2.2: Impact Forces with clamping at 2 m/s for different manipulators 
Robot Contact Force (kN) Maxilla Fracture? 
LWRIII 0.6 @ 1 m/s No 
LWRIII 1.2 @ 2 m/s Yes 
KR3 2.2 @ 2 m/s Yes 
KR6 (Cat0 & 1) 5.1 @ 2 m/s Yes 
KR500 (Cat0 & 1) 23.6 @ 2m/s Yes 
Robot Contact Force (kN) Frontal Fracture? 
LWRIII 3.5 @ 2 m/s No 
KR3 6.9 @ 2 m/s Yes 
KR6 (Cat0 & 1) 16.3 @ 2 m/s Yes 
KR500 (Cat0 & 1) 86.3 @ 2 m/s Yes 
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2.1.4 Safety Evaluation and Control 
There has been previous work done in both controlling the manipulator and 
evaluating its safety during operation.  Kulic and Croft [22] established a Danger 
Criterion (DC), based upon end-effector position and inertia factors.  The inertia factor is 
shown in Eq. 2.2. 
                     (2.2) 
Here,  is the current inertia of the manipulator and  is the maximum 
allowable safe inertia in the manipulator.  The distance factor is computed with the 
distance between the centers of mass of the manipulator and the human/potential hazard.  
This factor is shown in Eq. 2.3. 
   
:
0                         
         (2.3) 
 represents the current distance between the centers of mass of the 
manipulator and the hazard, and  represents a radius beyond which the manipulator 
is deemed to be safely unable to reach the hazard.  k is a simple scaling factor chosen by 
the operator to scale the potential function to one when the distance between the hazard 
and the manipulator is less than a minimum allowable distance.   
These two factors are then combined in a product to form the final danger 
criterion, as in Eq. 2.4. 
     ·              (2.4) 
Since both criteria are scaled to be between zero and one, the DC will also be 
necessarily be between zero and one, with a value of one indicating a high amount of 
danger and a value of zero indicating no danger of a collision is present in the system.  
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This can then be combined into an objective function to control the manipulator during 
standard operation and using any sort of control optimization scheme. 
In situations where a collision is more imminent, the authors modify this approach 
to include a velocity factor as well.  This factor is calculated as in Eq. 2.5. 
 
   
:
0                        
              (2.5) 
Also, rather than use simple end-effector information, this is modified to use the 
critical point for metrics.  This refers to the closest point on the manipulator to the hazard.  
In Eq. 2.5, v is defined as being positive when the manipulator is moving towards the 
person, as well.  Because the critical point is being used, the distance factor calculation 
changes to that shown in Eq. 2.6. 
   
:
0                        
          (2.6) 
In this equation, s refers to the distance from the hazard to the critical point on the 
manipulator rather than the distance between the two centers of mass.  With these factors 
calculated, the Danger Index (DI) is calculated by multiplying the DC by the velocity 
factor as in Eq. 2.7. 
    · ·                 (2.7) 
With the DI calculated, the authors then use it in a control scheme to generate a 
virtual force, pushing the manipulator away from collisions when a collision appears to 
be imminent, rather than relying on the more macro-scale DC described previously.  Also 
to be noted is the use of piece-wise functions in the criteria, which allow for the criteria to 
be ignored when the manipulator is not currently in a safety-critical state.  This allows the 
operator to implement these criteria into control optimization at all times with a minimal 
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impact on the overall performance of the manipulator.  This type of non-invasive 
integration of safety controls into the system makes integration into existing controllers 
easier and will hopefully lead to more wide-spread adoption of safety techniques. 
Another framework for safety evaluation is laid out by Ikuta et al [4].  This 
approach is much more comprehensive, including factors to account for the weight of the 
manipulator, absorption of covering material, compliance of the joints, physical shape of 
the links, and surface friction of the impact as passive inputs to the system based on the 
manipulator design.  Active factors input into the model include distance, magnitude of 
approaching velocity, and moment of inertia of the manipulator.  Each of these inputs is 
combined into an overall measurement of the danger of the manipulator.  This can be 
represented either as a single number, usually represented as the product of all danger 
indices, or as a node chart, with each node corresponding to one of the separate danger 
indices.  An example of the latter is shown in figure 2.6. 




In the demonstrated charts, the nodes in the lower half represent the manipulator-
dependent factors such as the manipulator mass and the link compliance.  These will be 
constant for the manipulator regardless of its location and speed.  However, the robot 
control based criteria such as the distance and approaching velocity are shown to increase 
until they are outside of acceptable limits as the manipulator moves closer and closer to 
the human inside the workspace. 
In order to allow for simple combination of the danger-indices from various 
factors, this work also scales every factor to between one and zero.  The calculation is 
additionally scalable to allow for as many or as few different defined safety strategies to 
be included, as shown in Eq. 2.8. 
     ∏                 (2.8) 
In this equation, α refers to each individual safety strategy while n is the total 
number of safety strategies utilized.  As before, the smaller the value of the danger index, 
the safer the manipulator is.  By combining the factors with a product, it additionally 
allows for the full effect of an extensive safety strategy.  An example given by the 
authors is that if the manipulator is covered in a perfect shock absorption material the 
safety factor due to the material absorption will be zero and so the manipulator will pose 
no danger to a human.  No matter what the forces are due to the other factors, this one 
safety factor will completely mitigate them, and this formulation reflects that. 
This work shows a more comprehensive examination of safety than most 
operators or designers need or are exposed to.  Often, the compliance of the joints or the 
shape of the links will be pre-defined before control strategies are implemented, so 
including them in an analysis may only serve to muddle said analysis.  The overall 
picture presented by Ikuta is useful on a very large scale, but often the tasks described 
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(link design compared to robot control) will be implemented by two completely separate 
sets of designers and operators, and so it may represent too broad an approach to the 
safety problem. 
Alternatively, Jeong and Takahashi [21] developed a more comprehensive torque-
based braking strategy in order to optimize safety of the system.  This control strategy, 
referred to as Dynamic Acceleration Polytope Braking (DAPB), is a torque-based control 
intended to achieve maximum deceleration in order to reduce the impact force in the 
event of a collision.  This braking algorithm seeks to decelerate the manipulator within 
the manipulator’s torque bounds while minimizing the changes in the initial direction 
vector of the velocity. 
The algorithm works by starting with the standard dynamic equation for robotic 
manipulators, Eq. 2.9. 
   ,              (2.9) 
Then, through differentiation of the standard mapping from joint space to 
Cartesian space, two new vectors are defined in Eq. 2.10 and 2.11. 
    ̃ ,                (2.10) 
                    (2.11) 
Using these equations, the following relation is determined in Eq. 2.12. 
      ̃               (2.12) 
In general, however, the joints will not operate under equal joint bounds, so in 
order to keep each joint torque within the accepted torque limits, it’s necessary to scale 
the individual joint torques based on the limits.  This is done by applying Eq. 2.13 to the 
operational torque. 
     ̂ ̃                  (2.13) 
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Where ̃ ,  and ̃ ,  refers to the maximum adjusted torque of 
the i-th joint, defined in Eq. 2.14. 
        ̃ , , ,             (2.14) 
Here, it is shown that this ̃ ,  is the maximum applicable torque given the 
current state of the manipulator.  This means that the set of realizable accelerations for 
the manipulator is defined as Eq. 2.15. 
    ̂                (2.15) 
Eq. 2.15 defines a mapping of the hypercube, ̂, to a polytope in end-effector 
acceleration space.  This polytope is the Dynamic Acceleration Polytope (DAP) referred 
to by the title.  This mapping can be seen in figure 2.7. 
Figure 2.7: Mapping of hypercube in joint torque space to DAP in end-effector 
acceleration space [Jeong and Takahashi, 2009] 
 
The braking torque is then found by calculating the intersection of the braking 
direction with the DAP in end-effector acceleration space.  This braking acceleration, 
, , can then be used to find the appropriate joint torques by substituting into Eq. 2.15 
and solving the inverse problem.  In the case of redundant manipulators, special care 
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must be taken to ensure that the choice of inverse doesn’t result in calculation of joint 
torques that exceed the torque boundaries of the hypercube.  Because of these concerns, it 
is infeasible to use a simple pseudo-inverse for this calculation, and a more complicated 
inverse may be required.   
Simulation results for this control scheme shown promise in their ability to 
improve on standard braking methods.  This includes a vastly improved ability to 
maintain a constant end-effector velocity direction during the stopping of the 
manipulator. 
Haddadin et al [23] proposed yet another method of collision response in their 
work involving using an observer to detect torque disturbances and maintaining the 
manipulator’s path while making the manipulator extremely compliant in end-effector 
space.  This is designed to be useful in a case where there are expected external forces 
applied to the system but unexpected forces still need to be accounted for.  If the force 
exceeds an acceptable amount, it is still possible to revert to another stopping strategy. 
The entirety of the control algorithm is omitted from this report, but the authors 
calculate the expected external torques throughout the manipulator’s motion, in order to 
distinguish between forces which oppose the motion of the manipulator that will 
generated a reactive response, and forces that are part of the standard execution of the 
manipulator’s trajectory.  A general block diagram and sample path of a manipulator 






Figure 2.8: Compliant reactive strategy and sample path [Haddadin et al, 2009] 
 
2.2 CAPABILITY ESTIMATION 
In order to determine the capabilities of the manipulator to fulfill any set of 
performance criteria, it is important to know how the actuator’s capabilities affect the 
performance in task space.  This was extensively examined in Rios [11], who developed a 
framework to estimate manipulator performance capabilities based on the actuator 
transmission gains (gear trains), and the actuator parameters (torque capacity and rotor 
inertia). 
Table 2.2 shows a simple overview of how the actuator level parameters affect 
various system level parameters.  Given that safety is the main concern of this work, the 










Speed Force Eff. Mass Accel. Accuracy 
Gear Ratio x x x x x 
Speed x     
Torque  x  x  
Encoder Resolution     x 
Stiffness  x   x 
Efficiency x x  x  
Mass  x x x  
Inertia  x x x  
 
 As can be seen in table 2.2, the gear ratio between the actuator and the joint is the 
single greatest determinant of mappings between actuator space and the system-level 
measurements.  As such, it will inform most of the designer’s decisions and will be the 
primary independent variable when providing the operator with a design decision to be 
made to optimize according to a specific task requirement. 
Because the two primary drivers in safety analysis are inertia and acceleration, the 
mapping of actuator parameters to these system outputs in included. 
2.2.1 Inertia Estimation 
The effective inertia of an actuator at the system level will comprise only part of 
the total inertia of the system, since the links will necessarily have inertia as well as long 
40 
 
as they are not massless, which is physically impossible.  Therefore the total inertia of  all 
links i to N can be represented by Eq. 2.16. 
         ∑                         (2.16) 
In Eq. 2.16, , and  represent the inertia of actuator and link j about axis  i, 
respectively and are given as in Eq. 2.17 and 2.18. 
   Π     (2.17) 
                Π        (2.18) 
Where ,  are the masses of the actuators and links respectively and Π , Π  
are the local inertia matrices of the actuators and links respectively.  The Jacobian terms 
are the i-th columns of the translational and rotational components of the first-order 
influence coefficients associated with the centers of mass of the actuator and link j.  
Substituting Eq. 2,18 and 2.17 into Eq. 2.16 gives an equivalent inertia matrix including 
the inertias of both the actuators and the links.  However, this does not take into account 
the effects of the actuator gear train upon the motor inertia.  This relationship is through 
the square of the mechanical gain, that is, , so Eq. 2.17 can be re-written as 
Eq. 2.19. 
  ,      
(2.19) 
Here, the x- and y- components of the motor inertia are assumed to be negligible 
compared to z-component and so are excluded.  After substituting this final equation, Eq. 
2.19, into Eq. 2.16, the designer is able to determine exactly how the individual actuator 
inertia and gear trains affect the total inertia of the system. The inertia will have an 
extremely large effect on the total energy in the system, which is considered a key issue 
in the overall safety. 
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2.2.2 Acceleration Estimation 
Once the inertial parameters have been determined, Rios demonstrates that it is 
possible to estimate the acceleration capacity of the manipulator.  The acceleration is 
directly related to the torque through the inertia, so solving this in terms of the torque and 
then substituting into the standard Jacobian mapping ( ) yields the Eq. 2.20. 
        (2.20) 
By assigning an arbitrary direction ̂ to be the direction of the acceleration and ai 
to be the magnitude of the acceleration, Eq. 2.20 can be transformed into Eq. 2.21. 
 
̂ ∑        (2.21) 
 This additionally involves the decomposition of the inertia into its individual 
components in order to separate the joint torques.  Finally, after substitution of the motor 
torque and gear ratio relationship for the torque in equation joint 1 and taking the 2-norm, 
a final relationship can be attained in Eq. 2.22. 
 
    ∑
∑
       (2.22) 
 This means that the minimum end effector acceleration can be defined in terms of 
the gear ratio and motor torques and inertias, allowing for a relatively straightforward 
mapping of the parameter.  Additionally, since it is a simple sum over every joint, the 
choices are largely decoupled, so the designer is able to make actuator design decisions 
largely independent of one another.  There will remain a small amount of coupling 
between the gear ratios within the inertial terms, but this effect should be negligible 
compared to the straight, inverse relationship that the effective acceleration has with the 
mechanical advantage.  As can be seen clearly, as the mechanical advantage will decrease 
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(corresponding to an increase in the gear reduction ratio), the manipulator’s acceleration 
capacity will increase.  This is directly in contrast with the desired effects of the gear 
train upon the manipulator inertia, but the designer will have to optimize these opposing 
forces depending upon his their discretion and the task which the manipulator will 
perform. 
2.3 CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, an overview of the safety research being done was presented.  
First, work with sensor systems focused on identifying hazards within the work space and 
improving the manipulator’s environmental awareness was presented.  These included 
simple sensors and elaborate camera systems. 
Next, research being done to make manipulators more mechanically safe was 
shown as a method to improve safety.  Selectively compliant actuators, shock absorbent 
coatings, and hybrid actuators all fall under this category.  These represent much more of 
a front-end design problem than any of the other safety methods presented in this report. 
After this, the work being done to quantify the injury potential for manipulators 
was present.  This work is vital in particular to allow for the relaxation of standards for 
the use of manipulators in pHRI applications.  Until it can be demonstrated that the injury 
potential for manipulator operation is within an acceptable tolerance, it will not be 
possible to certify manipulators for use in human environments.  This requires the 
mapping of manipulator operating standards to injury severity metrics that already exist 
within more established safety injuries. 
Finally, research about control strategies and safety metrics was presented.  This 
included the all encompassing work of Ikuta et al, which included many manipulator 
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design factors in addition to control strategies.  Additionally the work of Kulic and Croft 
showed a methodology to constantly assess the level of danger within a manipulator 
system and optimize the manipulator path according to that level of danger.  Optimal 
strategies for reacting to collisions included not only the DAPB by Jeong and Takahashi, 
which sought to maintain a constant trajectory while mapping braking performance to 
end-effector acceleration space, but also the selectively compliant work done by 
Haddadin et al, which attempted to adjust for expected and unexpected system torques in 
the system. 
Next, the mapping of actuator parameters to system performance was briefly 
presented.  A methodology to map both the system inertia and acceleration capability as 
functions of the motor torque and gear ratio was presented in order to demonstrate a 
framework for performance capability of more complex metrics. 
There are many aspects to safety in manipulators, and the improvement of safety 
for manipulators will encompass all four areas presented in this chapter.  Each problem 
can be addressed largely independently, as this report seeks to address one small niche in 
defining a framework for the evaluation of the actual stopping trajectory generated by a 

















Safety Criteria Development 
In formulating and choosing criteria to evaluate the safety of a stopping trajectory, 
an emphasis was placed upon criteria with a clear physical meaning.  Simplicity was also 
a key factor in choosing the criteria.  It is desirable for an operator to be able to easily and 
intuitively understand how each criterion will affect the safety of the manipulator’s 
stopping motion, and the applicability for different tasks.  While no single criterion can 
completely measure the safety of the manipulator, the combination of criteria presented 
below provides a useful cross-section. 
Because the importance of each criterion to the overall safety of the manipulator 
varies from task to task, it makes it even more important for the operator to be able to 
understand the physical meanings of the criteria.  Particularly as robotics moves into a 
greater degree of reconfigurability, this ability to determine the safety of the manipulator 
quickly and intuitively will become important.  Rather than requiring a complete re-
analysis of the manipulator’s safety given a new task, a simple overview of select criteria 
can let the operator determine whether the safety performance is still acceptable. 
After presenting the criteria in the first two sections of this chapter, a simple 2 
DOF case study is examined in order to demonstrate the applicability of the criteria.  This 
also provides an example interpretation of the results with the physical meaning 
explained for the manipulator in the case study. 
3.1 SYSTEM LEVEL SAFETY CRITERIA 
The criteria that fall under this category comprise the criteria that the operator 
should use to evaluate the safety of the manipulator’s interaction with its environment.  
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These criteria are largely the calculated as a result of the motion of the end-effector after 
the stopping command is received and the system begins to decelerate the joints to zero 
by whatever control scheme the operator has chosen to implement.  In terms of 
evaluating the overall safety of the system, however, the criteria listed here are the 
pertinent ones for the operator.  Some combination of these criteria should be sufficient 
to determine the general safety of nearly all robotic tasks. 
It should be noted, though, that these by no means represent a complete set of 
safety criteria.  The criteria presented here are chosen because of the combination of an 
understandable  physical meaning, and a direct relation to the safety of the end-effector.  
This list may be expanded upon in the future, as later research or work demands. 
3.1.1 Total Distance Traveled 
             (3.1) 
Table 3.1:  Physical meaning of total distance criterion 
Criteria Values Physical Meaning 
TDT→0 Manipulator End-Effector does not move from location that stop 
command is received at 
TDT→∞ Manipulator end-effector moves a large distance from location 
that stop command is received at 
 
 This is the most generic criterion related to stopping trajectories.  The primary 
goal in stopping a manipulator is to prevent further motion of the manipulator.  This 
criterion measures the total distance traveled from the moment that the stopping 
command is received (xi).   Since there is no linear mapping that occurs between motion 
in joint space and Cartesian space, this is a non-trivial matter.  Motion at joints closer to 
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the manipulator base will tend to have a greater effect on motion than motion at joints 
closer to the EEF, as well. 
 Since safety hazards will occur only if there is a collision between the 
manipulator and another object, without any directional information it is possible using 
solely the distance to construct a sphere of safety representing the sum total of possible 
locations that the manipulator could have entered during the stopping trajectory.  As long 
as no object enters this sphere, no safety hazards will occur without catastrophic failure 
of one or more of the underlining mechanical elements of the manipulator (gear train, 
actuators, link damage). 
 The total distance traveled is also important due to the fact that safety studies have 
shown that distance is a critical component in determining the potential injury that could 
be suffered by a clamped impact.  In this situation, an individual is trapped between the 
manipulator and a rigid surface.  This causes additional fracture and organ damage as the 
manipulator moves towards the rigid surface through the individual’s person.  By 
minimizing this distance, it is possible to minimize the potential damage that can occur if 
the manipulator were to clamp an individual in the worst case scenario that the 
manipulator motion is perpendicular to the clamping surface.   As has been shown in the 
Haddadin et al [19], the robot’s weight has almost no correlation to the potential damaged 
caused by the manipulator in a clamping situation.  As long as this criterion is minimized, 





3.1.2 Directional Distance Traveled 
 
    ·         (3.2) 
Table 3.2:  Physical meaning of directional distance criterion 
Criteria Values Physical Meaning 
dDST→0 Manipulator End-Effector does not move in direction u from that 
stop command is received at 
dDST→∞ Manipulator end-effector moves a large distance in direction u from 
location that stop command is received at 
 
 This criterion expands upon the previous one by adding in directional 
information.    In general, the total distance traveled may not be a critical safety issue 
since it is unlikely that the manipulator will be surrounded on all sides by potential safety 
hazards.  Far more likely is that the manipulator will only have possible safety hazards 
located in certain directions from the EEF, such as a wall, or a human working alongside 
the manipulator in a cooperative environment.  In this case, it is far more critical to 
minimize motion towards the wall or human than it is to prevent motion in general.  It is 
far safer to allow the EEF to move five cm away from the human than it is to allow the 
manipulator to move one cm towards the human, since any degree of contact between 
manipulator and human will result in a safety violation.  This is especially important in 
pHRI (physical Human-Robot Interaction) applications, because by controlling the 
allowable areas within the robot workspace for humans to be located in, it is possible to 
further improve safety over a simple stopping procedure by a control scheme that 
optimizes according to this criterion.  If the critical value of this criteria can be 
determined for a manipulator over its entire workspace, proper safety controls can be 
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effectively implemented to prevent any safety hazards from occurring in the 
manipulator’s operation. 
 This is especially important considering the injury potential due to clamping that 
was discussed with regards to the previous criterion.  Injuries can be minimized by 
preventing motion in the direction of the clamping surface.  Simply preventing motion in 
a direction normal to the clamping surface during the stopping trajectory will improve 
upon the gains possible with the previous criteria, while also providing a greater degree 
of certainty to the data. 
 The u vector in this equation should be a unit vector in order to allow for a point 
of comparison with the previous criterion.  A non-unit vector will introduce additional 
scaling to the criterion, making it difficult to measure the difference between the two.  
Because of this issue, it is recommended that the operator ensure that the vector used is 
always normalized.  
3.1.3 End-Effector Kinetic Energy 
 
                 (3.3) 
Table 3.3:  Physical meaning of end-effector kinetic energy criterion 
Criteria Values Physical Meaning 




Energy stored in the manipulator takes a long time to be 




 Due to the laws of conservation of energy, the amount of energy transferred to an 
individual or object by the manipulator is inherently limited by the amount of energy 
stored in the manipulator at the moment of contact.  Therefore, it is desired to minimize 
the kinetic energy stored within the manipulator at all points in the stopping trajectory.  
This criterion seeks to address the issue.  By measuring the kinetic energy in Cartesian 
space, the mass effects of the links are accounted for in the model rather than simply 
addressing the inertia of the actuators.  With the link mass information accounted for, the 
criterion can differentiate between critical and non-critical states of energy storage within 
the system. 
 In general, this criterion along with the following two criteria can be seen as 
measurements of the potential severity of a collision, rather than determining the 
potential for a collision itself.  For many applications where the operator may consider 
collisions to be inevitable within the operation of the system, including systems with a 
large amount of obstacles moving in unpredictable patterns, or systems which operate 
closely in tandem with humans where contact with the manipulator may be assumed. 
3.1.4 Link Stiffness 
 
    ∑ ∑ ,        (3.4) 
Table 3.4:  Physical meaning of link stiffness criterion 
Criteria Values Physical Meaning 
STF→0 Manipulator is in a configuration such that impact forces will 
cause deflection of the end-effector 
STF→Manipulator 
Dependent Maximum 
Manipulator is in a configuration such that impact forces will 




 Similar to the EEF Kinetic Energy criterion, minimizing this criterion does not 
affect the possibility of a collision, but simply the severity of a collision, should one 
occur.  The link stiffness is a measure of the resistance of the EEF to movement upon 
application of a force at the EEF.  It is desired to be minimized in situations where 
damage to the manipulator is more preferable than damage to the potential sources for 
collision, since a manipulator in a “softer” configuration will be more likely to absorb 
impact in the form of deflection by the EEF, rather than simply continuing through the 
collision point.  This will result in a situation in which the gear train and links of the 
manipulator are more likely to sustain damage from the unnecessary motion in the 
opposite direction of the actuator motion.   Still, in the event that it is of greater 
importance to protect the potential collision hazards than it is to prevent damage to the 
manipulator, this is a valid criterion to optimize.  Although the operator should note that, 
similar to the previous criterion discussed, this should be considered a secondary criterion 
to optimize since the primary goal of all safety procedures should be to prevent collisions 
rather than to minimize damage in the event of a collision.  In the end, this criterion will 
not in general minimize the total damage caused by a collision, but will instead transfer 
the damage done to the manipulator rather than the part of the environment with which 








3.1.5 End-Effector Velocity 
 
                   (3.5) 
Table 3.5:  Physical meaning of end-effector velocity criterion 
Criteria Values Physical Meaning 
VEL→0 Manipulator end-effector quickly decelerates to a safe speed 
VEL→∞ Manipulator end-effector slowly decelerates to a safe speed 
 
 This criterion goes along with the minimum total distance criteria.  The 
importance behind differentiating between the two is that studies have shown [19] that in 
an unclamped impact, the velocity of the manipulator at impact has the greatest 
correlation with the degree of injury, or Head-Impact Criteria (HIC), a common method 
of measuring potential head trauma.  Since velocity is more important in this situation 
than the weight or acceleration of the manipulator, it is included here as a potential 
criterion to be minimized.  In general, this will always be important since the stopping 
procedure itself is a minimization of the velocity norm, and so it may not be necessary to 
monitor this criterion explicitly.  However, as separate optimizations are applied for 
distance traveled, it may be desirable to combine the optimization with this criterion as 
well, to both ensure that the manipulator is stopping in the minimum time possible and to 
minimize potential damage in an unclamped collision.  However, as shown by Haddadin 
et al [19], the latter point may be of less importance since the likelihood of an unclamped 
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collision resulting in serious injury to a human is very low, regardless of the speed or size 
of the manipulator. 
 This criterion can alternately be framed in as a “time to safe velocity” criterion.  
As described previously by Haddadin et al, there is some velocity beneath which the end-
effector will no longer cause lethal or catastrophic injury.  By defining this “safe” 
velocity, and measuring the time it takes the end-effector to slow down to less than this 
velocity, this may prove to be more useful to the operator in terms of evaluating the 
safety of the manipulator.  An example of this methodology is shown in the case study in 
section 3.2 of this work for both this and the following criterion. 
3.1.6 Directional End-Effector Velocity 
 
      ·             (3.6) 
Table 3.6:  Physical meaning of directional end-effector velocity criterion 
Criteria Values Physical Meaning 
dVEL→0 Manipulator end-effector quickly decelerates to a safe speed in the 
direction u 
dVEL→∞ Manipulator end-effector slowly decelerates to a safe speed in the 
direction u 
 Similar to the directed distance criterion, this criterion expands upon the simple 
velocity criterion by adding directional information.  Again, u represents a 6x1 unit 
vector containing the directional information that is important to the operator.  








Since the directional vector should indicate a specific direction in which motion 
will be hazardous, it is usually the case that motion in the opposite direction poses no 
safety issue, and so can be safely ignored by the operator or control scheme in calculating 
an optimized path. 
 However, there may be some issues with this criterion depending on the task 
being executed.  If the potential safety hazard to be avoided is contact with a human, 
motion that isn’t normal to the subject could be considered just as dangerous.  For 
example, with a cutting tool, normal motion may result in a deeper puncture wound while 
motion transverse to the subject results in a longer slicing wound.  In this case, it would 
be important to monitor not only the velocity normal to the direction that the subject lies 
in, but also non-normal velocities, and so the operator would be wise to include the total 
velocity data in their calculations as well. 
3.1.7 Distance From Given Trajectory 
Table 3.7:  Physical meaning of distance from given trajectory criterion 
Criteria Values Physical Meaning 
TRJ→0 Manipulator end-effector stays close to given trajectory during 
stopping motion 
TRJ→∞ Manipulator end-effector moves a large distance from given 
trajectory during stopping motion 
 
 This criterion seeks to measure the distance between the end-effector and a set 
trajectory (usually the trajectory at the time the stop command is issued.  In order to 
provide for ease of calculation, this trajectory is assumed to be a straight line.  The 
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distance between a point in space and a straight line was calculated in Perry and Tesar, 
although the derivation is included as follows. 
Figure 3.1: Derivation of distance between a point and a line [Perry and Tesar, 1995] 
 
 
In this derivation, the line denoted by P1 and P2 is considered to be some initial 
trajectory.  This can either be specified by the operator or else determined automatically 
by using the initial position and velocity of the manipulator’s end-effector.  P3 represents 
the current position of the end-effector, which will obviously vary over the course of the 
trajectory. 




            (3.7) 
 
Similarly, a point on line 2 can be represented parametrically by Eq. 3.8. 
 
            (3.8) 
 
 Because Point 4 is located on both lines 1 and 2, Eq. 3.8 can be re-written as Eq. 
3.9. 
 
          (3.9) 
  
 Since lines 1 and 2 are perpendicular, it should follow that the dot product of the 
parameter coefficients is equal to zero, so Eq. 3.10 holds true. 
 
   · 0     (3.10)  
 
Solving this equation for t1 gives Eq. 3.11 as the solution. 
 
             (3.11) 
 
With t1 calculated, P4 can be determined as Eq. 3.12. 
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         (3.12) 
  
And the minimum distance between the end-effector and the original trajectory can be 
determined in Eq. 3.13. 
  min      (3.13) 
This criterion is especially useful for tasks where the specific path of the end-
effector is of importance.  This includes applications such as seam welding, where 
moving away from a specified path can cause damage to the objects being welded to each 
other, or in rehab applications, where a manipulator moves in a set path in order to 
exercise a joint.  Deviation from this path could cause harm or injury by twisting the 
rehab subject’s appendage in an unnatural way or moving out of a designated “safe” path 
predefined by the operator.  This medical rehab work as described is not currently 
certifiable by U.S. safety standards, but the principles remain the same. 
3.2 JOINT LEVEL CAPABILITY CRITERIA 
The joint level criteria presented here are wholly different than the system level 
criteria.  The system level criteria should be optimized to judge the overall safety of the 
manipulator during a stopping procedure.  However, for the joint level criteria, the 
emphasis is placed on the optimal operation of the system internally.  These criteria give 
the operator a way to evaluate the manipulator’s performance during the stopping 
procedures. 
As a rule, by examining these criteria, the manipulator operator or designer can 
gain insight into potential areas for improvement, either by adjusting the mechanical 
gains of the actuators, or changing the actuators themselves in the case of the designer.  
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Additionally, monitoring these criteria can help the operator decide whether it is possible 
to make further performance gains in the system level criteria.  As long as there remains 
leeway in the joint level criteria between the measured values and the acceptable 
maximums, the manipulator is not performing at maximum capacity with regards to the 
system level criteria that are important to the prevention of collisions and the overall 
safety of the stopping procedures.  This will also give the designer or operator insight into 
the overall balance of the system.  If one or two actuators are performing a 
disproportionate amount of the work in stopping the system, these criteria will indicate 
the problem and allow the designer to adjust the system either by selecting more powerful 
actuators or adjusting the gear ratios for these joints.  By singling out these bottle necks 
in the system, it is also possible for large performance gains to be realized by changing 
the actuator parameters for only one or two joints that are limiting system performance 
rather than changing parameters at each joint to attempt to achieve performance gains. 
3.2.1 Torque Ratio 
 
     
,
/           (3.13) 
Table 3.8: Physical meaning of torque ratio criterion 
Criteria Values Physical Meaning 
TRT→0 No actuators operate near the specified torque limits 
TRT→1 One or more actuators are operating near the specified torque limits 
TRT>1 One or more actuators are operating in an unsafe manner outside the 




 In standard operation, an actuator’s torque is limited to the nominal torque value 
to prevent damage to the actuator.  However, during stopping procedures, it is desirable 
to utilize the maximum capacities of the actuator.  This is allowable due to the short and 
infrequent nature of stopping procedures.  In general, the maximum allowable torque is 
between three and five times the nominal torque.  This uncertainty is represented by the 
α-constant, hereby known as the stopping coefficient, which can be chosen by the 
operator to be anything greater than one and less than five, although in general, should 
chosen to be between three and five to maximize performance.  Lower values for the 
stopping coefficient will represent a more conservative view with a lower performance 
capability, while higher values will allow for greater performance.   A value of one for 
the coefficient corresponds to a stopping procedure which does not utilize the added 
torque capabilities beyond the nominal torque of the actuators. 
 While the values of three to five represent an enhanced performance relative to 
that provided by the nominal operating torque, these still represent torque values that the 
actuators should be able to provide with little risk of damage to themselves or the system.  
However, it is often the case that damage to the system or a component may be more 
desirable than the consequences of a collision, which could include serious or fatal injury 
to an operator within the manipulator workspace.  In these cases, the value of the 
stopping coefficient may be chosen to be as high as ten.  For values above five, however, 
it may be necessary to replace or perform maintenance on the actuator that crosses this 
torque limit in order to ensure that future safe operation of the system. 
 A great deal of attention should be paid to this criterion, though, in order to ensure 
optimal performance of the system level criteria.  While it is desirable in general to 
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minimize this criterion to whatever extent possible, larger values will be indicative of 
better overall performance in stopping trajectories.  As this criterion increases, it indicates 
that the manipulator is performing closer to the peak of its abilities in terms of being able 
to decelerate the joints, thereby slowing the EEF as quickly as possible.  As values drift 
farther and farther from one, it indicates that there is a performance gap between where 
the joints are actually performing at, and the performance capability of the joints.  In this 
sense, it is desirable to maximize the maximum value of this criterion, even though it is 
listed as a minimization criterion. 
 The reason it is desirable to keep this criterion minimized is that operating 
actuators at above their nominal torques for extended periods of time can lead to actuator 
damage or failure.  There, the operator must make a trade off.  If a faster stop is more 
desirable without regard to actuator condition, minimizing this criterion should be 
considered less important.  For applications where it is necessary to prevent actuator 
damage, however, this criterion should be closely monitored. 
 This can be monitored either nonlinearly, as a maximum of all the actuators, 
which is important to provide the operator with the current performance of the actuator 
operating most closely to its threshold, or else as the average over all actuators, to 
provide a continuous criterion and display the overall degree to which the system is 
performing to its capabilities. This additionally allows for the use of optimization 
strategies which require differentiable objective functions and constraints, a common 






3.2.2 Kinetic Energy Distribution 
 
                 (3.14) 
Table 3.9: Physical meaning of kinetic energy distribution criterion 
Criteria Values Physical Meaning 
KED → Manipulator 
Dependent Minimum 
Kinetic energy is evenly distributed throughout the links, 
resulting in no large energy concentrations 
KED→1 Kinetic energy is concentrated in one or more joints 
 For a manipulator to be performing at max efficiency, it is desirable for the 
energy to be evenly distributed throughout the system to prevent one actuator from doing 
the majority of the work over the stopping trajectory.  By monitoring the looking at the 
maximum of each link’s percentage of the total kinetic energy, this situation can be 
targeted and addressed.  This criterion will necessarily vary from a maximum of one (a 
single link contains all of the kinetic energy in the system) to 1/n, for an n-DOF 
manipulator, which would correspond to the kinetic energy being evenly distributed 
throughout the system.   
The maximum of these values is monitored because, as a percentage of kinetic 
energy, this is by necessity a zero-sum criterion over the entirety of the actuators.  The 
sum of each actuator’s value will always be equal to one, so an average is impractical and 
not useful as a measurement method. 
This criterion has one key weakness that is addressed in the following criterion, 
however, and that is that for the vast majority of manipulators, actuators near the base of 
the manipulator tend to be larger and have a greater torque capacity than actuators 
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towards the EEF, where precision and smaller sizes are more important.  Therefore, it 
may not be necessarily desirous to distribute energy completely equally throughout the 
system, but rather to distribute energy proportionally so each actuator is performing at the 
same percentage of its capacity in order to remove kinetic energy from the system in the 
most efficient way possible.  Blindly seeking to minimize this criterion in a manipulator 
with different sizes of actuators can lead to worsened performance and undue fatigue and 
damage being sustained by the lower capacity actuators in the manipulator.  The operator 
should therefore always use discretion when examining this criterion. 
3.2.3 Weighted Kinetic Energy Distribution 
 
               (3.15) 
Table 3.10: Physical meaning of weighted kinetic energy distribution criterion 
Criteria Values Physical Meaning 
wKED → Manipulator 
Dependent Minimum 
Energy in each joint is much less than the maximum possible 
concentration for that joint 
wKED→∞ Energy in one or more joints is near the maximum possible 
concentration for the manipulator configuration 
 In order to address the problems of the previous criterion, a weighted version of 
the kinetic energy distribution criterion was developed.  This criterion adds 
computational complexity, but allows for easy scaling of the values to eliminate the 
previously described issues of the generic Kinetic Energy Distribution criterion.  To 
calculate this, first the KE partition values are calculated as described in Tesar and Rios 
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[28] These numbers represent the maximum percentage of the kinetic energy that could 
potentially be distributed to each link.  Using this value as a scaling factor allows the 
operator to estimate each actuator’s relative energy capacity in its current configuration.  
Scaling to these values lets the operator judge better whether the energy distribution is 
acceptable given the differences in actuators than with the previous criterion.  A value of 
one will represent an acceptable state, regardless of which joint it occurs at, since it 
represents that actuator performing at the maximum acceptable capacity in terms of 
system energy distribution rather than absorbing the entirety of the system energy.  
Therefore, the operator should interpret values near one as evidence that there are not 
many performance gains available given the manipulator configuration, while smaller 
values will indicate that gains are potentially possible since no individual actuator is 
operating at or near its capacity. 
 Calculating this criterion adds a degree of computational complexity, however, 
since it requires the solution of an eigenvalue problem to determine the KEPV’s.  When 
examined off-line in an evaluation sense, this is may not be an issue, but if it is desired to 
monitor these values in real time, this makes this criterion less useful due to the 








3.2.4 Joint Kinetic Energy 
 
                 (3.16) 
Table 3.11: Physical meaning of joint kinetic energy criterion 
Criteria Values Physical Meaning 
JKE→0 Manipulator end-effector stays close to given trajectory during 
stopping motion 
JKE → Manipulator 
Dependent Maximum 
Manipulator end-effector moves a large distance from given 
trajectory during stopping motion 
 The other main issue with the stopping procedures that isn’t properly captured by 
monitoring partition values is the total kinetic energy present in the system.  Since 
partition values are scaled by the total kinetic energy present in the system, the KEPVs 
may show an undesirable distribution of energy even though the total energy distributed 
through the system is insufficient to cause any actuator to operate outside of its 
performance limits.  Thus, it becomes necessary to monitor the total energy present to 
ensure that no false flags are noted from a partition value analysis.  This can also be 
determined by analyzing the torque ratio criterion and checking that the offending joint as 
determined by partition value analysis is well within the torque limits at the time of the 
offense. 
 This criterion is closely coupled with the EEF-kinetic energy criterion, differing 
in the use of the  Jacobian and its pseudo-inverse to transform the energy into Cartesian 
space.  This is done since the kinetic energy as related to the potential damage inflicted 
by the system, whereas when monitoring the energy in joint space, it is more desirable to 
monitor the effect of energy on the joints and actuators themselves.  Therefore, even 
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though these two criteria are highly coupled, it is important to monitor both, since the 
separate transformations display two major different situations, both of which are 
important to be monitored. 
3.2.5 Joint Potential Energy 
 
          (3.17) 
Table 3.12: Physical meaning of joint potential energy criterion 
Criteria Values Physical Meaning 
JPE→0 No potential energy is stored within the manipulator joints 
JPE → Manipulator 
Dependent Maximum 
A large amount of potential energy is stored within the 
manipulator joints 
 During the operation of the manipulator, a rigid interface is often assumed, and in 
most cases, this is a valid assumption.  For high loading tasks, however, it is possible for 
this assumption to no longer be valid, so the operator may want to monitor the potential 
energy being stored in the joints due to loading of the system.  This can lead to errors 
from two sources.  First, a lot of potential energy stored in the system indicates that 
individual actuators may be close to mechanical failure, either in the form of a 
catastrophic break, or a less catastrophic, but also dangerous plastic deformation of the 
actuator, which will lead to permanent systemic errors. 
 Second, a large amount of potential energy stored in the manipulator indicates 
that there will be danger at some point when the energy is inevitably released from the 
manipulator.  Thus, while the manipulator may have less kinetic energy, as shown by the 
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previous criteria, this may not be entirely indicative of the true safety state of the 
manipulator, which is best represented by the total energy present within the manipulator.  
This may be neglected for low impact tasks with a lesser load, but as the loading and 
weight of the manipulator increases, it will be far more important to monitor this criterion 
to ensure safe operation of the system. 
3.3  2 DOF CASE STUDY 
  In order to demonstrate the use of these criteria, they were calculated for a 
2-DOF system with both joints moving at maximum joint velocities from a set position.  
These joints are decelerated by using a trapezoidal path plan with a set maximum 
acceleration to generate the plan.  This plan was generated in accordance with the work 
done by Peter March in 2004.  This was done to demonstrate both the safety metrics and 
how the operator should interpret them to improve safety in the system.  The system is as 
shown below in figure 3.2. 







Table 3.13:  Actuator parameters for system in case study 
 Parameter Axis 1 Axis 2 
Link 
Mass (kg) 20 10 
Inertia (kg-m2) 9 4 
CG Location (m) 0.4 0.3 
Length (m) 0.8 0.5 
Actuator 
Mass (kg) 10 5 
Rotor Inertia  
(kg-m2) 
2.5e-3 2.5e-4 
3.3.1 Model Description 
  In order to determine the total energy contained in both the links and actuators, it 
is necessary to define the effective inertia matrix as follows in Eq. 3.18. 
 
             (3.18) 
Where  is the effective inertia associated with the energy stored in the actuators and 
 is the effective inertia associated with energy stored in the links.  In this 2DOF 
manipulator, the effective inertia matrices are shown in Eq. 3.19 and 3.20. 
 
       0
0 0
      (3.19) 
                                                         (3.20) 
 
Where  and  are the locations of the center of gravity of each link in the local frame 
and  and  are the link lengths. The Eqs. for the  matrix are Eq. 3.21: 
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2 cos  
                        cos     (3.21) 
 
 
The effective inertia matrices for the actuators are Eqs. 3.22 and 3.23. 
        0
0 0
      (3.22) 
            (3.23) 
 
The additional assumption is that the actuators are centered about the joint axes of 
motion. Also, in order to transform the inertias into the proper space, let 
       (3.24) 
       (3.25) 
Where  and  are the rotary inertia of the actuator and the gear train reduction ratio, 
respectively of actuator k.  As the reduction ratio increases, this value will tend to 
dominate the inertia of the link.  The manipulator’s starting configuration is assumed to 
be , and  rad, and the initial speed of the manipulators is 1.4  
and 2.25 .  Simulations were run assuming that the acceleration limits for 
motion planning of the manipulator were unchanged from normal operation, and also 
again with more aggressive acceleration limits to illustrate the performance gains 
possible by using more of the torque capacity of the manipulator. 
 For this simulation, a standard set of gear ratios of 50:1 for the first joint and 10:1 
for the second joint were used.  The nominal torques for the actuators at joints 1 and 2 
were assumed to be 20 Nm and 10 Nm, respectively. 
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3.3.2 Joint Level Criteria 
3.3.2.1 Torque Ratios 
 First, the stopping trajectory was simulated assuming that the maximum allowable 
torque is equal to the nominal torque allowed during normal operation of the manipulator.  
This uses the standard manipulator’s operating accelerations, corresponding to the 
standard operation of the manipulator.  A standard stop in this context refers to the 
situation of the operator simply telling the manipulator to decelerate to zero speed with 
no Cartesian interpolation restrictions.  This path, shown in Figure 3.3, was generated 
using a trapezoidal motion plan, hence the square shape. 






Figure 3.4: Plot of joint torque ratios for standard stop 
 
Table 3.14: Table of maximum torque ratio values for standard stop 















This motion plan corresponds to optimizing with an alpha of 1 for the nominal 
torque limits criterion.  In fig. 3.4, the torque ratios of each joint are calculated assuming 
the three standard values of alpha (1.0, 3.0, 5.0) and plotted over the length of the 
stopping trajectory.  As can be seen from the graph, at no point in the trajectory does the 
criterion’s value exceed 1 for either joint, indicating that each axis of the manipulator 
stays within acceptable torque limits at all times.  As long as this continues to be the case, 
no torque errors should occur within any individual joint. 
 The other key point to note from this chart is that the criterion’s values for 
each alpha value stays below 1, with the criteria values calculated with α = 3.0 and α = 
5.0 significantly below one at all points in the trajectory.  If it is possible to operate the 
joint actuators at a higher torque than the nominal value for a short period of time, this 
should indicate to the operator that there are significant gains to be made in the 
performance of the manipulator by increasing the acceptable torque limits of the control  
system that generates the torque input for the actuators.  For a strictly kinematic control 
scheme, this would be accomplished by increasing the maximum acceleration limits of 
the joints,   In any torque control scheme, this could be addressed by simply increasing 
the maximum allowable torque by a factor of three of five, respectively.  The impact on 






















Figure 3.6: Torque ratios during active stopping scheme 
 
Table 3.15:  Maximum torque ratios during active stopping scheme 














 For the purposes of this paper, an “Active Stop” is defined as a stopping trajectory 
which allows for torques up to three times the nominal actuator torque during the short 
time span of the stopping motion, corresponding to a stopping coefficient value of three.  
As stated earlier, this is generally acceptable due to the short duration and extremely low 
duty cycle of this load upon the individual actuators. In general, however, it is up to the 
discretion of the operator to decide on the acceptable limits for the system.  It can be 
clearly seen, however, that this control scheme would put unacceptable loads on joint 2 of 
the manipulator if it was unacceptable to exceed the nominal torque value, with values of 
the criterion approaching three.  Since any value greater than one indicates a potential 
failure, this would constitute an unacceptable situation for the operator. 






Figure 3.8: Maximum torque ratios during aggressive stopping scheme 
 
Table 3.16: Maximum torque ratios during aggressive stopping scheme 














 Here, an “aggressive” stop is defined by the acceptable stopping torque to be five 
times the nominal torque value used during standard operation of the manipulator.  This 
should be considered to be the maximum acceptable torque under normal conditions, 
although if the designer deems it to be acceptable, higher values could be used at the 
corresponding higher risk of failure.  Again, as with the torque ratio values for the control 
scheme with alpha equal to three, it can be seen that this criteria would generate 
unacceptable conditions if the actuators were unable to exceed the standard values of 
either the nominal torque, or three times the nominal torque. 
3.3.2.2 Kinetic Energy 




Table 3.17: Time to “safe” kinetic energy in system 
Stopping Scheme Time to 60 J KE in system (sec) 
Standard (α = 1) 0.91 
Active (α = 3) 0.26 
Aggressive (α = 5) 0.16 
 
 As can be seen in the Figure 3.9, the total energy in the system decreases much 
more rapidly in both the active and aggressive stopping schemes.  In both of these cases, 
the total energy in the system falls below 60 J within .5 seconds of the stopping motion 
being initiated by the operator, a threshold which isn’t reached by the standard stop until 
nearly twice as long into the trajectory.  If the task requirements allow for a certain 
minimum amount of energy to be transferred to the environment without causing damage 
this provides a baseline time that the operator can be sure that the energy in the system 
will be below that minimum.  Here, it can be seen that if a maximum of 60J can be 
absorbed in a collision without damaging the manipulator or environment, there will be a 
.5 second window in which potential danger can occur.  Once this .5 sec passes, the 
operator can know with some degree of certainty that no damage can be done from a 
collision.  As with the previous criterion, because this is starting from the maximum 
allowable kinetic energy state this represents the worst case scenario.  In most normal 
operations of this manipulator, it is unlikely that the initial kinetic energy would be this 




3.3.2.3 Energy Distribution 
Figure 3.10: Kinetic energy partition values for different stopping trajectories 
 
 Once the total energy in the system is examined, it’s important for the operator to 
determine how the energy is distributed throughout the system.  Not only does the energy 
in the system represent a potential for damage to the environment in a collision, but 
because stopping control schemes naturally lead to condition where the actuators 
operating at extreme conditions.  When the actuators are operating near their allowable 
limits, additional failures are possible, so once the total energy in the system approaches a 
point that would cause a failure in any individual actuator, it becomes necessary to 





closer to the end-effector, which tend to be smaller and have less capacity to dissipate 
energy. 
 In this case study, it can be seen that there is a distinctly different shape between 
the partition values of the standard stop compared to the active and aggressive stops.  
This is not entirely unexpected, as operating at greater extremes can mean that joints will 
be able to cease motions at different periods in the trajectory, so that if joint 1 is able to 
decelerate to zero before joint two or vice versa, the partition values will be entirely 
different.  While it may be alarming to the operator to see the partition values go to the 
extreme values of zero and one, this only occurs as the total energy in the system goes to 
zero, and so should be disregarded as an issue.  For this manipulator and control scheme, 
however, it can be seen that at the highest energy levels (corresponding to the initial 
states of the manipulator), the energy is relatively evenly distributed with a little over a 
70% of the energy in the manipulator being located in the second joint.  This is within 
reason for a simple system, although ideally, the manipulator’s energy would be more 
concentrated in the larger and more powerful first joint.  If the total energy in the system 
were much larger due either to higher inertias in the links or actuators or greater initial 
velocities, this could be hazardous, as the weaker second joint is dissipating most of the 
energy in the system. 
 For this particular example, the problem could be alleviated in a couple different 
ways.  First, the second actuator can be changed out for a larger model.  This will actually 
make the numbers seem even more skewed since more powerful actuators weigh more, 
thereby increasing the inertia of the second joint relative to the first joint, resulting in 
more energy being concentrated in joint two assuming similar velocities.   
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Second, the gear ratio of the second joint can be lowered.  This will affect the 
partition values in a couple ways.  An actuator with a smaller reduction ratio tends to be 
heavier, so weight will be increased in the second joint, which will increase the joint’s 
local inertia, but lower the inertia at the joint level due to the small gear ratio, and 
redistribute more energy to the stronger first joint which is presumably much farther 
away from its operating limits.  The other benefit comes because the inertia of the motor 
is reflected through the gear train at a rate of the reduction ratio squared.  Therefore, even 
though the actuator inertia tends to be fairly small at the point of the actuator, lowering 
the gear ratio can lead to significantly less inertia being focused into lower joints.  In this 
case study, reducing the gear train reduction of the second joint from 10 to 1 could 
improve the energy distribution throughout the system by vastly reducing this squared 
multiplier.  However, this is a tradeoff, as the higher torques and higher prime mover 
mass seen at the joint will allow for lesser performance from the actuator in terms of 
being able to decelerate the joint more quickly.   Finally, the configuration of the 
manipulator can be altered by the designer by adjusting the link lengths or axis offsets 
and/or orientations.  This is a little more difficult since this must occur at the design 
phase rather than be done by the operator and any adjustments to the system 
configuration will affect the entirety of the criteria so that the total effects of the 






3.3.2.4 Weighted Kinetic Energy Distribution 
Figure 3.11: Weighted kinetic energy partition values for different stopping schemes 
 
Weighting the values of the kinetic energy partition values allows the operator to 
gain a little more insight into the energy distribution of the system.  As can be seen here 
and was described in the initial introduction of the criteria, the sum of the individual 
values for the joints for this criterion do not have to add up to one.  Also, this represents 
merely the percentage of the maximum partition value that is represented in the current 





standard stop near the end of the trajectory, the fact that the maximum percentage of 
energy that can be stored in the first joint is roughly 70% of the maximum that can be 
stored in the second joint, this does not represent a situation that should concern the 
operator.  In general, data from the KEPV criteria should be cross-examined with it, and 
the total energy present in the system.  While it is desirous in general to keep energy 
distributions balanced towards the more powerful actuators in the system, it is often the 
case, as shown here, that either the total energy in the system will make the energy 
distribution concerns fairly negligent, or the weighting of the partition values will cause 
potential false alarms in terms of joints approaching their partition value limits. 
3.3.3 System Level Criteria 
Having examined the actuator level criteria values to determine the maximum 
acceptable performance, it is useful to investigate the potential performance gains from 
using the different allowable values of alpha as a failure point.  Often, there is no simple 
rule to say that one value of alpha should be used over another, but instead, it is up to the 
designer and operator to evaluate the options and tradeoffs and decide upon an acceptable 








3.3.3.1 Total Distance Traveled 
Figure 3.12: EEF distance traveled over different stopping trajectories 
 
Table 3.18  Total distance traveled over different stopping trajectories: 
Stopping Control Scheme Total Distance Traveled (mm) 
Standard (α = 1) 359.5 
Active (α = 3) 99.1 




 The first criterion for assessing the safety of a stopping trajectory is the distance 
traveled by the end-effector.  Shown in the above figure is a plot of the distance traveled 
over time.  As can be seen, there are large gains to be made by increasing the acceptable 
torque during a stopping procedure.  This gain can be seen to be roughly proportional to 
the alpha value, with the distance traveled for alpha equal to three being roughly one 
fourth of the distance traveled with the nominal value for alpha, as shown in the table.  
Similarly, the distance traveled for alpha equal to five is roughly one sixth of the distance 
traveled with the nominal value.  This will vary depending on the initial state and 
configuration of the manipulator, but it provides a simple example of the potential 
benefits to be gained from using greater acceptable torque values. 
 By using this simple “worst-case” scenario of an initial state with all joints 
moving at maximum velocity  in the same direction, it is possible to generate a type of 
upper limit on the distance traveled during a stopping motion.  Therefore, it can be 
assumed that for this manipulator these values can provide a reasonable estimate of the 
maximum distance that the end-effector will travel once a stopping command is received 
by the actuators.  With this upper limit, the operator can determine whether the safety 
requirements are being met by the manipulator or if a more aggressive stopping control 
scheme needs to be implemented.   In this example, if the manipulator’s task 
requirements called for the maximum stopping distance to be less than 70 mm, the 
manipulator could be considered unsuitable for the task, and so a different manipulator 
would have to be chosen or the designer would have to evaluate a different manipulator 





3.3.3.2 Directional Distance Traveled 
Figure 3.13: Directional distance traveled over different stopping trajectories 
 
Table 3.19:  Distance traveled in u-direction over different stopping trajectories 
Stopping Control Scheme Distance Traveled in u-direction (mm) 
Standard (α = 1) 316.4 
Active (α = 3) 93.5 




Usually for safety applications, however, it is less important that the end-effector 
not move at all, and more important that the end-effector not move in a specific direction, 
either toward a location where humans are, or else towards the object that the 
manipulator is currently being used to work on.  In this example, the direction designated 





In the equation for the criteria.  This is again, completely arbitrary and chosen 
simply because it represents a direction the manipulator is moving in during the stopping 
trajectory.  If the direction were chosen in the negative x or positive y directions, this 
criterion would be trivial in this case because no motion occurs in that direction.  
However, if the joint velocities were simply reversed, this triviality would reverse itself.  
Also of note is that the vector chosen is a unit vector.  This is recommended to provide 












3.3.3.3 Distance From Given Trajectory 
Figure 3.14: Distance traveled from initial trajectory over different stopping trajectories 
 
Table 3.20:  Distance traveled from initial trajectory over different stopping schemes 
Stopping Control Scheme Distance Traveled off initial trajectory (mm) 
Standard (α = 1) 36.8 
Active (α = 3) 5.4 




 This criterion, perhaps more than any other is most dependent on the initial state 
of the manipulator so while examining extreme cases for the joint velocities can be useful 
in the sense of giving an estimate of the criterion’s maximum value for the manipulator’s 
configuration, the operator and designer should be careful to note that this will vary 
wildly depending not only on the configuration of the manipulator, but also the path 
chosen. 
 Still, in this configuration, it can be seen that there is a significant departure from 
the initial trajectory.  Depending on the application, this may be considered a potential 
safety issue.  While a 36.8 mm departure from the trajectory may be acceptable for a 
welding application in which the only potential issues are damage to the part(s) being 
welded.  However, if the robot were being used in a rehab application, this departure 
from the desired trajectory could be sufficient to either cause discomfort to the individual 
in the sense of wrenching the body part being exercised out of its comfort zone, or else 
cause harm by actually impacting the subject.  If it is the latter, care should be taken to 
monitor the potential for clamping and velocity of the manipulator.  As described 
previously, these have been shown to be the greatest indicators of potential injury in the 
case of impact.  For reference, a plot of the actual trajectories followed by the EEF during 





















3.3.3.4 End-Effector Velocity 
Figure 3.16: End-effector velocity over different stopping trajectories 
 
Table 3.21: Time to “safe” velocity for different stopping trajectories 
Stopping Control Scheme Time to reach 1.5 m/s (sec) 
Standard (α = 1) 0.75 
Active (α = 3) 0.22 




 After examining the distance traveled during the stopping trajectory, another 
important criterion to examine to measure the overall safety is the end-effector velocity 
of the manipulator.  As described in the previous section, this is important because 
previous work has shown that the velocity at point of impact is the greatest determinant 
of injury severity during impact with a human in a collision.  In this sense, it is useful for 
the operator to determine beforehand a cutoff “safe” velocity, below which a collision 
would cause either negligible or else non-catastrophic harm, depending on the application 
and the safety requirements.  For this application, the arbitrary value of 1.5 m/s is chosen. 
 In order to measure the safety, the time to reach this speed is calculated for each 
of the stopping schemes.  Again, large gains can be seen from utilizing the capabilities of 
the actuators beyond the nominal torque with a 70% reduction in the time to a safe 
velocity occurring when a “active” stopping scheme is used and over an 80% reduction 
from the aggressive stopping scheme.  Since the initial joint velocities being used here 
are a maximum and both in the same direction the end-effector velocity contributions 
from each joint will be additive, and so performance in normal applications should be 
considered to be better than that measured here. 
 The other point of interest in Figure 3.16 can be seen with the slight job in the 
velocity curve near the end of the trajectory.  This discontinuity is a result of the first 
joint completing its motion, with the final section of the trajectory representing the 
motion of the second joint alone.  This discontinuity represents a pitfall of using 





3.3.3.5 Directional End-Effector Velocity 
Figure 3.17: Directional end-effector velocity over different stopping trajectories 
 
Table 3.22: Time to reach 1 m/s in u-direction for different stopping trajectories 
Stopping Control Scheme Time to reach 1 m/s in u-direction(sec) 
Standard (α = 1) 1.07 
Active (α = 3) 0.36 




 In order to gain more insight into the safety situation using the velocity 
information, the directional information can be used as well.  By adding the directional 
information, depending upon the nature of the potential safety hazard, the operator can 
maintain stricter velocity limits to assert that the manipulator is in a “safe” state.  In 
particular, if the potential hazard comes from the potential to impact a human, this can be 
important since the most potential for an injury from a collision between a manipulator 
and a human stems from motion in the normal direction to the subject.  However, 
depending on the tooling located at the end effector, there may be as much potential 
damage regardless of whether the robot is moving normal to the subject, or transverse 
along the subject.  For example, a tool designed to cut would either result in a deeper 
puncture wound, or a longer, but shallower slicing wound, depending on the motion of 
the manipulator at contact with the human subject.   
3.4 CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, two sets of criteria were presented.  First, a set of system level 
criteria to measure the safety of a manipulator’s stopping motion was presented to 
provide a framework to assess how safely a manipulator is able to halt itself.  Next, a set 
of joint level criteria to assess the degree to which the prime movers are performing to 
their limits was established to allow the operator to assess whether any joint is near an 
unexpected failure. 
Finally, a 2DOF case study was presented in order to demonstrate the use of the 





Effect of Actuator Parameters on Stopping Criteria 
For the manipulator designer, it is often desirable to be able to estimate the effects 
that the actuator parameters will have upon the stopping performance of the manipulator.  
Therefore, some knowledge of the relationship between parameters such as the nominal 
torque values and the gear reduction ratios and the ability of the manipulator to safely 
stop can be of great use to the designer.  This provides for simpler calculations rather 
than requiring the designer to run complete simulations of the system’s dynamics in order 
to determine whether the manipulator meets task specifications.  Thus, the designer is 
able to start with a simple set of task requirements, and from these, choose appropriate 
actuators and gear reductions to satisfy them.  For the most part, however, these remain 
as mathematical estimates, with the actual values largely dependent on the exact control 
scheme used to generate the joint trajectories.  Particularly as control strategies are 
implemented in order to optimize trajectories according to the safety criteria presented, 
these estimates may prove to be worse than the actual performance achieved by the 
system.  However, this will be counterbalanced by the fact that stopping constraints will 
not allow the manipulator to perform at peak end-effector decelerations over the course 
of the trajectory.  As seen in the previous section with the discontinuous end-effector 
velocity curve, as each joint decelerates to zero, it is no longer able to effect the 
deceleration of the end-effector, resulting in the manipulator not being able to sustain the 
maximum end-effector acceleration over the course of the trajectory.  
These estimates can also be of use to the operator when task requirements change 
and it must be determined whether the manipulator can meet these new requirements.  As 
robotic systems become more and more modular this kind of reusability will become of 
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greater importance, making it important for quick estimates to be determined of 
manipulator capabilities.  While any manipulator in a structured, industrial environment 
should still undergo full testing and re-certification when the task requirements change, 
manipulators deployed in field uses with lesser certification requirements may be able to 
use a simpler method of estimation in order to save the operator time and effort  
4.1 END-EFFECTOR SAFETY CRITERIA 
As described in the previous chapter, there are five criteria that are directly related 
to the position and velocity of the end-effector during the stopping trajectory.  These 
criteria are Total Distance, Directed Distance, End-Effector Velocity, Directed End-
Effector Velocity and Distance from Trajectory.  All of these are dependent mainly upon 
the manipulator’s capacity to decelerate the end-effector.  Therefore, in order to estimate 
a manipulator’s performance in these criteria, its capacity to decelerate must be known 
given the actuator parameters.   
4.1.1 Acceleration Estimation 
 In order to estimate the end-effector acceleration capacities given the actuator 
parameters, work done by Rios is implemented.  The full derivation of the equations can 
be found in his work, but the final equation derived relating actuator parameters to the 
acceleration capacity of the end-effector is as follows in Eq. 4.1 and 4.2. 
 
     
∑
            (4.1) 
     ∑          (4.2) 
 Where, ai
eff is the effective contribution to the acceleration capacity of each 
actuator and ai
manip is the actual acceleration capacity of the actuator in end-effector 
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space.  Because the stopping controls are only being applied for limited times, however, 
this allows for an additional modification of Eq. 4.1 as seen in Eq. 4.3. 
 
     
∑
            (4.3) 
 The α coefficient in Eq. 4.3 accounts for the additional torque capacity usable due 
to the low duty cycle and duration of stopping control.  This accounts for the designer’s 
intent that the manipulator may use more than the nominal torque during a stopping 
motion, and should be chosen appropriately to avoid damage to the actuators during this 
motion.  This coefficient should always be greater than or equal to one, but typically 
ranges between three and five, although the actual choice is up to the discretion of the 
manipulator designer. 
The actuator parameters easily controlled by the designer that the end-effector 
acceleration is dependent on are the motor torque, τM, and the gear reduction ratio, . The 
designer also has a limited ability to control the actuator inertia without altering the 
manipulator configuration because of the differences in actuator and gear train weights.  
Typically, more powerful actuators and larger gear trains will have greater masses, 
resulting in higher inertias, although there can be a tradeoff with cost as well.  More 
expensive actuators will generally have much better power/weight ratios, so the designer 
can weigh this as a design factor as well. 
However, an additional factor that must be considered when choosing actuators 
and gear reduction ratios is the fixed torque requirements.  All manipulators will require a 
minimum amount of torque to support the weight of the links and payload, so factoring in 
the need to generate torque above this minimum threshold, the designer may consider the 
product of the gear ratio and the prime mover torque to be relatively constant.  Therefore, 
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special attention should be paid by the operator the gear ratio’s effect on the system 
inertia.  The prime mover inertia is amplified into joint space by the square of the 
reduction ratio, so this will have a great effect in general upon the system responsiveness 
since the acceleration capacity is inversely related to the inertia of the system.  In general, 
the designer should pay special attention to the inertia in designing the system in order to 
assure that the acceleration response will be adequate for safety measures. 
4.1.2 Estimating Velocity Criteria 
Knowing the acceleration capacity of the manipulator is only the first part of the 
criteria analysis, however.  Once the designer is able to estimate the maximum 
deceleration capacity of the manipulator, some simple calculations are required to convert 
this acceleration into useful safety criteria estimations. 
First, some assumptions are required.  Because it is desired to look at worst-case 
performance, the manipulator’s initial end-effector speed will be assumed to be some 
manipulator dependent maximum operating speed.  This is intended to closely simulate 
operating conditions in application environments, where the maximum end-effector speed 
is often specified. 
The second assumption will be a constant acceleration at the maximum capacity.  
This will obviously be a somewhat more ideal situation than will actually occur, since 
this requires an immediate impulse in the acceleration that is unable to be achieved in 
actual operating conditions.  More likely, either a control scheme such as the trapezoidal 
or polynomial motion plans will be implied, meaning that the actuators will take slightly 
longer to reach the maximum acceleration.  Still, these effects should be fairly small, and 
the estimate will still be valid. 
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The final assumption is that each of the joints is able to use its acceleration 
capacity to decelerate the end-effector, resulting in the maximum acceleration.  As shown 
in Eq. 4.2, the acceleration capacity is a sum of the effective accelerations of each of the 
actuators, if any actuator is not actively working to decelerate the end-effector, the 
possible acceleration will be less.  This situation may occur if one or more of the 
actuators start at rest or at a very low speed, as most control schemes will disregard an 
actuator from control once it is at rest. 
Using these assumptions, it is easily shown with a simple integration that the end-
effector velocity at any point during the stopping motion can be simply estimated as in 
Eq. 4.4. 
                 (4.4) 
is defined as in equation 4.2.  This can be further expanded upon if the 
designer wishes to estimate the time to reach a “safe” end-effector velocity by 
substituting for this velocity and solving for the time as in Eq. 4.5. 
 
                      (4.5) 
 Because it is so dependent on the actual state of the manipulator, there is no 
reliable way to estimate the directional velocity criterion, short of running actual 
simulations.  Insight into estimating the criterion’s potential values can be gained by 
examining the previous analysis.  These estimates can be seen as fairly definitive worst-
case estimates for directional velocity criterion values, because the direction is 
unaccounted for, so all motion is inherently assumed to be in the direction in which 
motion is trying to be prevented.  In the real world, this is never the case, as the 
manipulator will most likely only rarely be moving in the exact direction, and as seen 
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with the 2 DOF case study, the process of stopping the manipulator often leads to 
direction changes, and the end-effector not following a set linear trajectory, making it 
highly unlikely that the directional velocity value could ever even be equivalent to this 
estimate.  Therefore, the same estimate should be used for the directional velocity 
criteria, with the designer and/or operator assuming that the actual performance will be 
much better than this estimate, regardless of the actual direction in which motion is to be 
prevented. 
4.1.3 Estimating Position Criteria 
Similar to the velocity estimation, knowing the velocity and acceleration of the 
end-effector allows the operator to get a viable estimate for the distance traveled by the 
end-effector during the stopping trajectory.  Again, with a simple integration from 
equation 4.4, equation 4.5 shows the position of the manipulator. 
                     (4.5) 
Since the actual, Cartesian position is largely irrelevant in safety terms, the 
differential can be calculated simply as in equation 4.6. 
                     (4.6) 
Using Eq. 4.4, the designer is able to obtain an estimate of the time it takes the 
end-effector to reach either a zero velocity or the designated “safe” velocity.  Substituting 
for this time gives Eq. 4.7. 
                    (4.7) 
In Eq. 4.7, if the designer wishes to estimate the total distance traveled during the 
stopping motion, a value of zero should be used for the safe velocity.  Otherwise, the 
designer can determine how far the end-effector travels until it reaches a “safe” velocity, 
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designating two separate concentric spheres of differing “danger”.  Within the smaller 
sphere, the end-effector is traveling at an unsafe speed during the stopping motion.  
Within the larger sphere, the end-effector is still moving, but at a velocity that would be 
considered nonlethal should a collision occur. 
As with the velocity criteria estimation, the directional criteria are largely 
neglected here because of its high dependence on the actual state of the manipulator.  
Similarly, though, the estimate of the distance traveled without directional information 
can be used as a worst case scenario for the directional distance if the designer or 
operator wishes to obtain a rough estimate. 
Finally, the trajectory distance criteria is so coupled with the initial state of the 
manipulator at the time the stopping command is received that it is impractical to 
estimate it at all.  Depending on the manipulator state and stopping control scheme used, 
the end-effector may follow the given trajectory extremely closely, or may veer wildly.  
This makes it impractical to estimate without a full simulation.  If the designer wishes to 
take this criteria into account during the design process, a more thorough simulation 
should be run, allowing directional estimates to be obtained since the trajectory estimates 
are largely useless without any directional estimates of the stopping motion. 
Now that each of the end-effector state criteria can be estimated as a function of 
the motor torque and the gear reduction ratio, the designer is able to take the task 
requirements and use them to determine a valid actuator and gearing combination to 
satisfy the requirements. 
4.2 JOINT-LEVEL CRITERIA 
Also of importance to the designer and operator is how the actuator parameters 
relate to the internal energy distributions and torque capacity of the manipulators.  
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Evaluating these estimates are a little more opaque to the designer and a little less 
controllable since most control schemes will result in the actuators performing at near 
their maximum capacity.  While this may limit the insight gained from examining this 
relationship, it can still be useful to the designer in order to determine the full state of the 
actuator. 
Table 4.1:  Effective actuator output properties for high gear train reduction ratio (i.e. 










 Increased inertial content of actuator with 
potential for high impact loads. 
 Leads to a slower and less responsive system. 
Speed  
ωM  
 Decreased speed capacity of actuator. 
 Leads to a slower system. 
Torque 
τM  
 Increased torque capacity of actuator. 




 Increased stiffness of actuator. 
 Leads to  more accurate system that can handle 
a higher load capacity 
Damping 
ζM  
 Increased damping of actuator. 
 Leads to a non-linear system behavior with 
lower resolution, speed and responsiveness. 
Table 4.1 contains some examples of how an actuator’s properties are mapped 
into joint space from motor space through the gear train.  Of importance to the designer 
for joint level safety criteria is the mapping of the motor torques and inertias relative to 
the gear ratios. 
101 
 
  4.2.1 Torque Ratios 
For the operator, a manipulator operating at the peak responsiveness capacities 
determined in Section 4.1 means that one or more joints are operating at near the torque 
operating limits.  This is due to the close relationship between an actuator’s acceleration 
and torque capacities.  When simple motion plans are being used, however, it may be of 
use to examine how the actuator’s torque ratio criteria values change if the motion plan 
parameters (i.e. maximum joint accelerations/velocities) are kept constant with a 
changing gear ratio. 
Adding the gear reduction ratio into the equation for the torque ratio criterion 




/                (4.8) 
Assuming that the motion plan and actuators are the same, τk and τk,nom will be 
constant because the required joint torques will be the same to produce the same 
acceleration, and the nominal torque will be the same as long as the same actuators are 
being used.  As can be seen here, though, as the gear ratio rises, the torque ratio will 
decrease (  is the inverse of the gear ratio).  This is represented physically in the sense 
that larger gear ratios result in a larger mechanical advantage, allowing the motor torque 
to be felt at a greater effect at the joint space. 
In order to demonstrate these effects, the 2 DOF manipulator used for the case 
study in the previous chapter was examined using various gear ratios for each joint to 
show the effects of altering the gear ratio.  Because the gear ratio is a discrete variable, a 
set of five gear ratios was chosen for each joint.  Joint 1 gear ratios were chosen to be 
[10, 20, 30, 40, 50], and joint 2 gear ratios were chosen to be [5, 10, 15, 20, 25].  All 
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combinations of these ratios were evaluated, and the surface plots comparing the torque 
ratios for actuators 1 and 2 are shown in Figures 4.1 and 4.2, respectively. 











Figure 4.2: Surface plot of torque ratios for joint 1 by varying gear ratio. 
 
These plots were generated using the standard stopping control scheme described in 
previous chapters (i.e. α = 1), but since this represents a simple coefficient, the only 
difference between plots for various alphas would be to adjust the scaling of the z-axis.  
As can be seen from the plots, the two torque ratios are largely independent of the 
opposite joint’s gear ratio.  This is because the control scheme involved a simple 
deceleration of each joint independently.  If an optimization scheme were used to 
minimize distance traveled or some other criteria, some coupling of the torque ratios 
would be inevitable. 
 It is also clear from these plots that as the gear ratio lessens (larger reduction 
ratios), the actuators quickly descend into unsafe operation territory.  The lesser 
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mechanical advantage associated with a smaller gear ratio results in a lower capacity for 
the actuator to decelerate the joint.  Since this control scheme is previously set to have the 
second joint operating at near its torque capacity, reducing the effective torque capacity 
in joint space quickly forces the actuator beyond its capacity. 
 However, with the first joint, even at the smallest gear ratio, the actuator still stays 
within torque limits, indicating that, at least for this initial configuration and state, the 
designer would have a large range of choices for the gear ratio in the first joint.  By 
selecting a smaller gear ratio the designer may increase the speed capacity of the joint 
and also decrease the amplification of the motor inertia into joint space, resulting in less 
kinetic energy being present in the system. 
4.2.2 Kinetic Energy 
As with any mechanical property, transmission through a gear train will either 
amplify or lessen its value.  With the torque capacity, a larger mechanical advantage 
results in greater torque capacity at the joint in a linear relationship.  Inertia behaves 
inversely.  From Table 4.1, it can be seen that mapping the inertia from the motor level to 
the joint level is amplified by the square of gear reduction ratio.  Especially with large 
gear ratios or actuators, this can lead to a huge energy amplification at the end-effector, 
which may result in increasing the energy to an unacceptably dangerous level. 
The exact relationship between the criteria and the gear ratio for the kinetic 
energy is a little more opaque, however.  Since the links and end-effector load are not 
massless, their contributions must be taken into account as well.  This final inertia is 
represented in Eq. 4.9. 
                     (4.9) 
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Where  is a vector of the gear ratios and is equal to the inverse of the mechanical gains, 
.  The inertia due to the end-effector load is included in the link term for the link inertia.  
Substituting this into the equation for the kinetic energy criteria gives Eq. 4.10. 
            
              (4.10) 
 Since the link inertia is largely fixed given the configuration, the designer has a 
limited control over this criterion.  To give an example of the variance that can be 
obtained by varying the gear ratios, the 2 DOF case study is used again.  Figure 4.3 
shows the differences in the maximum kinetic energy over the same range of five 
discretized gear ratios for each joint. 




 As can be seen in the plot, the total kinetic energy will increase as either gear ratio 
increases.  A greater effect is seen from joint one due to not only the greater difference 
between the discrete values, but also the fact that the motor inertia in the first actuator is 
an order of magnitude greater than the motor inertia in the second actuator. 
This detrimental behavior is in direct opposition to the potential gains achieved by 
the increased torque capacity at the joint level from a greater gear ratio.  Therefore, it is 
up to the designer to examine and balance the different objectives and determine the 
optimal configuration of actuator parameters to satisfy the task requirements.  
In terms of comparison, however, this configuration is an extreme case, given the 
large difference in the prime mover inertia compared to the link inertias and the relatively 
small gear reduction ratios.  More commonly, the prime mover inertias will dominate the 
link inertias, and this effect will be even more pronounced. 
4.2.3 Kinetic Energy Distribution 
Even less clear to the designer is how the distribution of energy within the system 
will be affected by varying the gear ratios.  This energy distribution is reflected by the 
kinetic energy partition value and weighted kinetic energy partition value criteria.  In the 
most basic sense, this can be approximated in the sense that a larger gear ratio means that 
more of an actuator’s inertia is amplified, so that joints with larger gear ratios will tend to 
have a greater inertia, so that if one joint’s gear ratio increases while all other are held 
constant, this will tend to shift more of the energy into this joint.  Depending on the 
relative inertias and gear ratios of the different prime movers in the system this effect 
may be more or less pronounced.  However, in general due to the large gear reduction 
ratios typically found in systems, especially at the shoulder joints, this should not be 
considered a trivial concern by the designer. 
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Once again, to display the effects of gear ratio changes upon the kinetic energy 
partition values, the 2DOF manipulator is used as an example.  Figures 4.4 and 4.5 
respectively show the effect of varying gear ratios upon the average kinetic energy 
partition values during the stopping trajectory. 









Figure 4.5: Effect of gear ratios upon average joint 2 kinetic energy partition value 
 
As seen in the plots, the total gear ratios are largely decoupled from the opposite 
joint’s partition value for this system.  Changes in the gear ratio for joint 1 have very little 
affect on the average partition value for joint 2 and vice versa.  The relatively small range 
in values for each plot is representative of the bounded nature of the criterion.  Still, large 
changes in the gear ratio here only affect the partition value by a maximum of nearly .1, 
meaning that the difference in energy distribution is roughly 10% of the total energy in 
the system.  For systems with higher gear ratios, and greater prime mover inertias relative 
to the link inertias, this will represent far more than 10% of the total energy.  Also, since 
the criterion constraints require the partition values to sum to one, the inverse nature of 




This chapter presented a simple framework for the manipulator designer to follow 
in order to estimate the safety criteria in the system to task safety parameters.  Methods of 
mapping both the gear reduction ratio of the actuator and the nominal torque of the prime 
mover to the distance that will be traveled in a stopping event and the inertia present in 
the manipulator allow for the estimation of not only the potential for a collision, but also 
the severity of a collision. 
Next, a discussion of how the actuator parameters affect the torque ratios and 
energy distributions was presented.  This mainly focused on the gear reduction ratio and 
the relative inertias of the system.  By monitoring the relative inertias during the design 
process the designer can gain an understanding of how the energy will be distributed 





Application to Industrial Environments 
In order to gauge the applicability and usability of the framework described in 
Chapter 3 to a standard industrial implementation of a manipulator arm, an analysis of a 
full 6DOF PUMA-type manipulator is presented in this chapter.  This includes an 
examination of the effects that the initial configuration, the operating speed, the inertial 
load at the end point, and different stopping control types has upon the ability of the 
manipulator to stop itself safely. 
5.1 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 








The manipulator upon which this case study was based was a 6DOF Puma-style 
arm, shown in Figure 5.1.  This manipulator geometry is based on the classic Unimation 
Puma-arm, although this specific manipulator setup is discussed more thoroughly in 
Tesar and Rios [28].   A full table of the standard Denavit-Hartenberg parameters for this 
manipulator is included in Appendix A. 
The actuator parameter values used for this manipulator are chosen based on 
values from a separate work by Rios evaluating a similar manipulator [29].  This solution 
was chosen to ensure that the manipulator has a sufficient ability to account for gravity 
torques during normal operation of this manipulator and to allow for an acceptable 
acceleration capability.  The gear trains of each actuator weigh 1.1 kg and have a rotary 
inertia of 7.9 x 10-2 kgm2. 
Table 5.1: Relevant Actuator Parameter Values 
Actuator 
Parameter 
Axis 1 Axis 2 Axis 3 Axis 4 Axis 5 Axis 6 
Nominal Motor 
Torque (N-m) 
3.85 3.85 3.85 2.51 2.51 2.51 
Weight (kg) 1 1 1 0.68 0.68 0.68 
Rotor Inertia 
(kg m2) 
6.57x10-4 6.57x10-4 6.57x10-4 3.12x10-4 3.12x10-4 3.12x10-4 
Gear Ratio 75 75 75 75 75 5 
 In order to develop a full dynamics model of the manipulator, the inertial 
properties of the links must be known as well.  While a standard PUMA arm tends to 
have complicated link inertias, in this analysis, each link was assumed to be a simple 
hollow cylinder to calculate these parameters in the absence of a real-life manipulator.  




Table 5.2: Link Inertial Parameters 
Link Mass (kg) Inertia (kg-m2) CG Location (m) 
2 1.8 (9.0x10-3,9.0x10-3,1.3x10-2) (0,0,6.3x10-2) 
3 5.1 (8.7x10-2, 8.7x10-2, 3.8x10-2) (0, 0, 2.0x10-1) 
4 4.4 (6.1x10-2, 6.1x10-2, 3.3x10-2) (0, 0, 1.8x10-1) 
5 0.1 (4.5x10-4, 4.5x10-4, 7.5x10-4) (0, 0, 0) 
6 0.9 (4.1x10-3, 4.1x10-3, 6.7x10-3) 0, 0, 5.0x10-5) 
With the system fully defined, the effects of the variable operating conditions 
upon the stopping performance of the manipulator will now be investigated. 
5.2 EFFECT OF OPERATING CONDITIONS ON PERFORMANCE 
Throughout the course of normal operation of a manipulator, the parameters under 
which the  system is operating may vary wildly.  For example, the effective inertia of a 
system operating near the edge of its work space may vary wildly from the effective 
inertia of a manipulator operating near its base.  If a manipulator is used in pick and place 
tasks, depending on the relative inertia of the object being carried, this will have a large 
impact not only upon the energy contained within the system, but also upon the ability of 
actuators to extract energy from the system given the redistribution of inertia towards the 
end of the manipulator. 
These effects are significant enough that it is useful for the operator to be aware 
of how they influence the system’s safety, and what the effect will be to the performance 
of the system over the course of a stopping motion.  To that end, four different, 
commonly adjusted operating parameters are shown here.   
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First, the effect of the initial configuration of the manipulator is shown, with the 
performance of a manipulator extended near the edge of its workspace compared to that 
of a manipulator contorted to operate near its base and that of a manipulator operating 
outside of its general X-Y plane. 
Next, the effect of different Cartesian operating speeds is investigated.  ANSI 
safety standards specify that a manipulator operate at no greater than 250 mm/s while a 
human is within the manipulator workspace [3] while the research done by Haddadin et al 
[19] indicates that speeds below 2 m/s may be sufficient to prevent injury.  The effect of 
operating at both a high and low speed according to the safety criteria presented here is 
investigated. 
Next, in order to address the specific case of pick and place operation and also 
that of tasks which require a heavy or high inertia tool, the effects of operating the 
manipulator with and without a high inertial load at the end of the manipulator is shown. 
Finally, different strategies from decelerating the manipulator are examined.  
Three different strategies are presented: the ramped trapezoidal acceleration motion plan 
as shown in Chapter 3, a constant acceleration motion plan for simplicity and ease of 
calculation, and a torque-based viscous braking strategy to generate decelerating torques 
based on the individual joint speeds. 
5.2.1 Manipulator Configuration 
As described, the effect of three different initial configurations representing the 
extremes of the possible manipulator configurations. These three configurations are 
shown in Figure 5.2.  The twisted configuration represents a situation in which the 
manipulator is tightly coiled about itself, operating near manipulator base.  The velocity 
at the start of the stopping motion is in the Cartesian direction, {1, -1, 0}. 
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Figure 5.2: Initial Manipulator Configurations 
 
Table 5.3: Joint Values of Initial Configurations of Manipulator 
Configuration Joint 1 Joint 2 Joint 3 Joint 4 Joint 5 Joint 6 Velocity  
Twisted 0 -45 45 -135 -60 -90 {-1,0,-1} 
Out of Plane 15 -45 15 90 -90 -45 {1,-1,0} 
Extended 0 -20 -40 0 60 0 {1,0,-.5} 
The next configuration corresponds to a manipulator roughly in the middle of its 
workspace, but oriented and moving orthogonally to the standard XY plane of the 
manipulator that corresponds to a zero value for the first joint.  This could be indicative 
of any task requiring motion through multiple axes in the workspace. 
The final configuration is when the robot is extended near the edge of its 
workspace, representing a task where the entirety of the manipulator’s workspace is used.  
For industrial applications, it is often more likely humans will not be near the 
manipulator base but instead operating around the periphery of the workspace, so this 




For each of these simulations, an initial speed of 500 mm/sec in the direction 
specified by the velocity in the table was used.  No additional inertial load was applied to 
the end-effector.  Additionally, a ramped acceleration motion plan in joint space was used 
to generate the trajectory. 
Figure 5.3 shows a plot of the distance traveled for the different initial 
configurations.  As can be seen, the total displacements of the end-effector are very 
small, but there is a significant difference between the performance of the manipulator in 
the extended configuration and the other two configurations, indicating that the 
configuration of the manipulator has a potentially large effect upon the safety 
performance of the manipulator.  For a higher speed or inertial load, this difference may 














Figure 5.3: Distance traveled for different initial configurations 
 
 Shown in Table 5.4 are the values for selected other criteria over the course of the 
stopping trajectory. The direction used to calculate the directional distance criteria is the 
initial direction of the manipulator, and the trajectory calculations are based off of the 
initial trajectory of the end-effector.  In order to quantify the speed and energy criteria, a 
“safe” velocity and kinetic energy were defined as 25 mm/s and 25 J, respectively.  The 




















Time to “Safe” 
Kinetic Energy 
(s) 
Twisted 1.0036 0.9949 0.1316 0.006 0.002 
Out of Plane 0.9343 0.9341 0.0219 0.005 0.001 
Extended 4.198 2.7955 3.1318 0.013 0.002 
In order to provide a point of comparison, the “Out of Plane” configuration was 
established as a baseline, and the relative magnitudes of the values were then calculated 
and presented in Table 5.5. 














Time to “Safe” 
Kinetic Energy 
(s) 
Twisted 1.07 1.07 6.01 1.20 2.00 
Out of Plane 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Extended 4.49 2.99 143.00 2.60 2.00 
As can be seen in Table 5.5, the configuration may have a profound difference on 
the degree to which the manipulator is able to satisfy the safety criteria.  In the 
“Extended” configuration, significantly worse performance was exhibited in all of the 
distance criteria, indicating that the potentially large impact that simply the manipulator’s 
configuration at the moment a stopping event is initiated can have upon the safety of the 
ensuing trajectory.  The large relative magnitudes of the trajectory distance value should 




In order to gauge the level to which the joints are performing at their capacity, 
Table 5.6 shows the maximum values of the torque ratios for each joint over the 
trajectory.  These were calculated for a stopping coefficient of one, so that the listed 
values correspond to the multiplier beyond which the actuator’s nominal torque is 
required.  Therefore, while values below five may be preferable, it is possible that any 
value up to ten may be acceptable to the operator if potential damage to the prime mover 
is considered an acceptable side effect of the stopping motion. 
Table 5.6: Maximum Joint Torque Ratios 
Configuration Joint 1 Joint 2 Joint 3 Joint 4 Joint 5 Joint 6 
Twisted 2.28 14.33 9.71 4.01 3.65 3.29 
Out of Plane 7.15 2.01 2.80 1.87 1.29 1.01 
Extended 0.17 7.01 5.79 0.00 2.53 0.00 
 
Of key interest in Table 5.6 is the value of the maximum joint torque ratio for 
joint 2 in the “Twisted” configuration.  This far exceeds even the maximum stopping 
coefficient value of ten prescribed previously in Chapter 3.  Because of this value, the 
operator could not confidently apply this trajectory to a real system with the given 
parameters and expect the system to handle it without error.  This means that either the 
operator must adopt less aggressive motion parameters such as acceleration limits to the 
trajectory generation scheme over the entirety of the workspace, resulting in lesser 
performance elsewhere, or else the motion parameters must be adjusted depending on the 
manipulator configuration, resulting in an added complexity to the trajectory generator. 
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As with the safety criteria, it is useful to determine how the configuration affects 
the torque requirements of a stopping trajectory.  Table 5.7 contains the relative 
magnitudes of the maximum torque ratios for each joint, again using the “Out of Plane” 
configuration as a baseline. 
Table 5.7: Relative Magnitudes of Maximum Torque Ratios 
Configuration Joint 1 Joint 2 Joint 3 Joint 4 Joint 5 Joint 6 
Twisted 0.32 7.13 3.47 2.14 2.83 3.26 
Out of Plane 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Extended 0.02 3.49 2.07 0.00 1.96 0.00 
As can be seen from the wildly divergent values, there is a fairly large effect that 
the configuration can have on each individual joint’s torque load.  This comes from the 
translation of the end-effector velocity to the joint velocities through the manipulator G-
functions being dependent upon the joint positions, which are different for each 
configuration.  The largest effects can be seen in the first three joints, which generally are 
used to locate the end-effector’s position in PUMA-style geometry.  The results from 
Table 5.7 indicate to the operator that monitoring one potential “problem” joint may not 
be sufficient to ensure the lack of hardware failures.  The relative magnitudes indicate 
that, depending upon the configuration, both joints 1 and 2 are potentially the closest joint 
to failure, with joint 1 potentially failing in the “Out of Plane” configuration and joint 2 
potentially failing in the “Twisted” configuration.  In different configurations not shown 
here, a different joint may be the closest to a potential failure, so the entirety of the 
system state needs to be monitored.  
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5.2.2 Inertial Effects 
One of the key values of a  manipulator’s is the ability to fit different tools at the 
end-effector in order to accomplish a given task.  Often, these tools are bulky and heavy, 
creating loads that must be accounted for during safety criteria calculations.   
In order to assess the effects of inertial loads at the end-effector, a steel bar 
measuring 50x500x50 mm was assumed to be in the manipulator’s grasp.  This set up is 
shown in Figure 5.4 in the “twisted” configuration.  The bar of these dimensions weighed 
9.8 kg with the inertias {0.2065, 0.0041, 0.2065} kg-m2 about the primary axes.  This is 
compared to the 23.94 kg total weight of the manipulator.  The inertia compares to the 
3.69 kgm2 inertia of the first actuator seen at the joint level and the 0.0078 kgm2 inertia of 
the actuator at joint 6 seen at the input level. 
Figure 5.4: Manipulator with High Inertial Load 
 
 In order to maintain a valid comparison, the same motion parameters (maximum 
accelerations and velocities) were used to generate the stopping trajectory.  Because of 
this, the same total distance will be traveled.  In order to gauge the effect that the 
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additional inertia will have on the system, it is important to gauge the different levels of 
kinetic energy present during the stopping motion.  This plot, including the values for 
each initial configuration is shown in Figure 5.5. 
Figure 5.5: Kinetic Energy During Stopping Motion 
 
 As further evidence of the dominant effect that the prime mover inertia has over 
all other inertias in the system, the presence of the inertial load at the end-effector has 
almost no effect on the safety criteria.  Because a kinematic-based trajectory generation 
scheme is used, the distance traveled and velocity criteria remain the same, so the only 
effect seen in the safety criteria will be in the total kinetic energy of the manipulator.  





amplification of the rotor inertias dominates all other inertias in the system, including that 
of the end-effector.  While a greater effect would definitely be seen with a larger inertial 
load at the end-effector, the issues of payload capacity and a manipulator’s ability to 
adequately control the load during normal operation within the nominal torque limits 
becomes a limiting factor. 
 Where the difference can be seen between the two loading situations is in the 
torque loading on the individual joints.  The maximum torque ratios for the inertially 
loaded manipulator in each of the three configurations are shown in Table 5.8. 
Table 5.8: Maximum Torque Ratios for High Inertia Load 
Configuration Joint 1 Joint 2 Joint 3 Joint 4 Joint 5 Joint 6 
Twisted 1.72 15.36 11.33 4.04 4.08 11.60 
Out of Plane 9.05 2.63 3.52 1.79 1.86 3.54 
Extended 0.43 8.83 6.96 0.00 2.91 0.00 
Compared with Table 5.6, where only joint 2 was operating outside of the loosest 
torque limits, the addition of a greater inertial load at the end-effector causes joints 2, 3, 
and 6 to require torques which are unacceptable to safe operation of the manipulator.  
Thus, even if the operator has taken care to adjust the motion parameters of a trajectory 
generator to ensure that all actuators will be operating within torque limits, the addition 
of an end-effector load may push one or more actuators outside those limits.  In order to 
determine how the inertial load affects the torque ratios, the relative magnitudes of the 
torque ratios compared to the unloaded state is shown in Table 5.9.  The values are 
normalized to the unloaded torques so that a value of one refers to the maximum torque 
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ratio refers to an equal maximum torque ratio to the unloaded trajectory for the given 
configuration found in Table 5.6. 
Table 5.9: Relative Magnitudes of Maximum Torque Ratios 
Configuration Joint 1 Joint 2 Joint 3 Joint 4 Joint 5 Joint 6 
Twisted 0.75 1.07 1.17 1.01 1.12 3.53 
Out of Plane 1.27 1.31 1.26 0.96 1.44 3.50 
Extended 2.53 1.26 1.20 0.00 1.15 0.00 
The greatest effect is unsurprisingly seen at the sixth joint, which saw its inertia 
effectively tripled by adding the tool inertia to the rotor and link inertia of the system.  
This results in required torques of roughly three times greater than that of the unloaded 
situation.  Small multipliers are also seen at joints 2 and 3 that can be at least partially 
attributed to the fact that with the PUMA manipulator geometry, these joints are oriented 
perpendicular to the gravity load, requiring these two joints to support the majority of the 
additional weight from the end-effector load. 
5.2.3 Effects of Operating Speed 
The Cartesian operating speed of the end-effector is one of the most important 
parameters for determining safety historically.  It remains the sole parameter specified in 
the RIA safety standard for industrial manipulators that can allow for a human to enter 
the workspace safely when it is below a specific value.  For the current standard, this 
speed is designated as 250 mm/s. 
In order to assess the effects of the speed, simulations were run at two different 
speeds: 500 mm/s as used in simulations in the previous sections, and 2000 mm/s as 
described in Haddadin’s work as the point of saturation for potential human injury.  In 
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Figure 5.6 the total distance traveled for the two different operating speeds in the 
different manipulator configurations is shown. 
Figure 5.6: Total Distance Traveled at Different Operating Speeds 
 
As can be seen in Figure 5.6, the operating speed of the manipulator has an 
extremely large effect on the distance traveled by the end-effector during the stopping 
trajectory.  This is especially pronounced for a kinematic trajectory generation scheme 
like the one used here since the actuator accelerations are specified so the larger joint 






The other key criterion that will be greatly affected by the increase in the initial 
velocity will be the kinetic energy of the manipulator.  This is due to the relationship 
between the kinetic energy and the velocity being the square of the velocity.  Since the 
other key component of the manipulator energy is the inertia, plots of the energy over the 
course of the trajectory for the various values of the velocity presented in this section and 
the inertia from Section 5.2.2 are shown in Figures 5.7, 5.8, and 5.9. 

















Figure 5.9: Kinetic Energy Plots for Extended Configuration 
 
 As seen in the figures, the speed has a much greater impact on the energy in the 
system than the inertia here.  Since there isn’t a clear mapping between the magnitude of 
the changes in the inertia and speed, this remains a somewhat qualitative assessment, but 
of the criteria presented thus far, the speed remains the biggest determinant of the safety 





















Time to “Safe” 
Kinetic Energy 
(s) 
Twisted 15.89 15.69 2.56 0.02 0.02 
Out of Plane 14.96 14.95 0.55 0.02 0.01 
Extended 62.78 37.27 50.52 0.05 0.04 
These values are clearly worse than those shown in Table 5.4, but the relative 
magnitudes shown in Table 5.11 illustrate the extremely large effect that the greater 
operating speed has upon the ability of the manipulator to halt itself safely.  The criteria 
magnitudes are normalized to the values from Table 5.4 for each configuration. 














Time to “Safe” 
Kinetic Energy 
(s) 
Twisted 15.84 15.77 19.49 3.50 7.50 
Out of Plane 16.02 16.01 25.10 3.40 10.00 
Extended 14.96 13.33 16.13 3.69 20.00 
As can be seen in Table 5.11, there are extremely large multipliers for every 
single criterion, with only the time to “safe” velocity representing a multiplier roughly 
equal to the four times multiplier between the two operating speeds used in this analysis.  
This represents by far the biggest effect of the three operating conditions previously 
described, so in terms of improving the operational safety of the manipulator, the greatest 
effect can be achieved from lowering the operating speed. 
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As with the previous comparisons, examining the torques required to generate the 
trajectories is important.  The maximum torque ratios for each joint are presented in 
Table 5.12. 
Table 5.12: Maximum Torque Ratios for High Initial Speeds 
Configuration Joint 1 Joint 2 Joint 3 Joint 4 Joint 5 Joint 6 
Twisted 2.35 14.35 9.57 4.04 3.69 3.43 
Out of Plane 7.57 6.39 4.55 2.32 1.28 1.70 
Extended 0.23 7.45 5.91 0.00 2.57 0.00 
As opposed to the high inertia load, a high speed stopping operation may be 
handled by the given motion parameters without exceeding acceptable torque limits.  
This indicates that if the manipulator’s inertial loads are well-known by the operator and 
do not change over the course of the task, a kinematic trajectory generator may be applied 
without worries of exceeding torque limits.  To show the relative effect of the initial 
speed on torque loads, the relative magnitudes are shown in Table 5.13.  These values are 
normalized to the low speed values from Table 5.4. 
Table 5.13: Relative Magnitudes of Torque Ratios for High Initial Speeds 
Configuration Joint 1 Joint 2 Joint 3 Joint 4 Joint 5 Joint 6 
Twisted 1.03 1.00 0.99 1.01 1.01 1.04 
Out of Plane 1.06 3.18 1.63 1.24 0.99 1.68 
Extended 1.35 1.06 1.02 0.00 1.02 0.00 
Table 5.13 shows the relatively small effect that the higher speed has on the 
torque required.  Since the greatest determinant of the joint torque is the acceleration of 
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the actuator, a kinematic control scheme will generally have similar torque requirements 
regardless of the starting speed.  The one exception to this rule is in the “Out of Plane” 
configuration with joint 2, which most likely can be attributed to this specific 
configuration.  If a manipulator approaches near a singularity during the stopping 
trajectory, anomalous torques such as this may be produced. 
While the 2 m/s operating speed used in this analysis represented the safe 
threshold for HIC impact found by Haddadin et al [19], it may represent greater operating 
speed than that commonly found in industry.  Particularly since the large effects of the 
operating speed are shown in this report, 1 m/s may represent a more commonly used 
operating speed.  This will still have a large, effect on the safety criteria compared to a 
low speed operation, as demonstrated by much larger effect that speed has on the safety 
criteria than any of the previously discussed operating parameters, but the effects 
observed will be less pronounced than at the threshold speed of 2 m/s. 
5.2.4 Effects of Stopping Control Schemes 
For every previous simulation in this report, and trapezoidal ramped acceleration 
trajectory generator was used to create stopping trajectories.  The advantages of this 
motion planning algorithm are discussed in Chapter 1, but the main advantage is the 
reduction of shocks to the system imposed by non-zero initial and final accelerations.  
The two alternate stopping trajectory generators presented in this discussion both involve 
non-zero initial accelerations, making them potentially less desirable. 
First, a simple constant acceleration algorithm was used to generate trajectories.  
This involves simply choosing a maximum acceleration for each joint and maintaining it 
over the course of the trajectory until the joint speed is equal to zero.  This was chosen 
for the ease of calculation. 
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The final trajectory generation scheme is a torque-based algorithm based upon the 
concept of viscous braking.  A torque is calculated by multiplying a constant chosen by 
the operator with the individual joint speeds.  This torque is then generated by the 
actuator in order to decelerate the system in addition to the fixed torques from the gravity, 
velocity, and external loads to the system.  This is shown for any joint i in Eq. 5.1. 
                (5.1) 
This system has the advantage of ensuring that the manipulator will not breach 
any torque limits of any individual actuator since the torque is being commanded, but 
adds in the added complexity of not being able to determine any of the location-based 
criteria without employing an accurate dynamics model.  Either a fixed value for the 
braking constant can be chosen no matter what the speed of the individual joints, or the 
braking constant values can be determined at the onset of the stopping trajectory by 
dividing the torque limit by the initial joint velocity for each actuator. 
While the two kinematics-based criteria generate roughly similar performance, the 
viscous braking method diverges greatly from those methods.  As an example of the 
different relative performances, Figures 5.10 and 5.11 show the different performances 





















Figure 5.11: Comparison of Stopping Controls for Extended, High Speed Configuration 
 
 As can be seen in the figures, depending on the initial speed of the end-effector, 
the stopping control scheme that best satisfies the criteria may vary.  In general, the 
torque-based scheme will do best at avoiding actuator torque limits and maximizing the 
performance with low inertias and high speeds.  In this situation a maximal amount of the 
torque is able to decelerate the system.  However, if a task requires a specific safety 
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criteria requirement such as distance traveled, it will be more difficult to ensure that this 
requirement will be satisfied. Table 5.14 shows the values of the safety criteria for the 
low operating speed in the different initial configurations for the torque-based control 
scheme. 














Time to “Safe” 
Kinetic Energy 
(s) 
Twisted 23.86 19.1 14.25 0.12 0.005 
Out of Plane 5.04 4.6 1.98 0.04 0.001 
Extended 11.85 5.8 10.32 0.13 0.002 
These values confirm what was seen in Figure 5.10; the torque-based control 
scheme performs significantly worse under low operating speeds.  Table 5.15 shows the 
relative magnitude of this control scheme compared to the ramped acceleration values 
from Table 5.4. 














Time to “Safe” 
Kinetic Energy 
(s) 
Twisted 23.78 19.20 108.31 19.17 2.50 
Out of Plane 5.40 4.92 90.23 8.60 1.00 
Extended 2.82 2.07 3.30 10.00 1.00 
Based on the values from Table 5.15, the choice of the control scheme used to 
generate the stopping trajectory of the manipulator is possibly the most important of the 
parameters discussed in this chapter.  The values for every safety criterion are 
significantly greater under the torque-based control scheme, at least at low operating 
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speeds.  Based on Figure 5.11, however, it appears that the torque-based braking scheme 
may provide improved performance at high operating speeds for the manipulator.  Table 
5.16 shows the relative magnitudes of the safety criteria for the high operating speed 
condition.  Because the greater operation speed is being used, the values are normalized 
to the standard values for the ramped acceleration at a high operating speed from Table 
5.10. 















Time to “Safe” 
Kinetic Energy 
(s) 
Twisted 5.93 4.11 26.80 9.62 4.40 
Out of Plane 1.36 1.25 14.88 5.76 0.90 
Extended 0.75 0.56 0.83 4.58 0.43 
Examining the values from Table 5.16 shows that the safety performance of the 
manipulator using a torque-based control scheme is highly dependent upon the 
configuration of the manipulator.  While the manipulator’s performance remains 
significantly worse for the “Twisted” configuration, it is only slightly worse for the “Out 
of Plane” configuration and shows a significant improvement in every criteria but the 
velocity in the “Extended” configuration.   
It is important to note, however, that the trajectories generated by the ramped 
acceleration kinematic algorithm required torques in some actuators that were outside of 
the actuator limits.  As with the previous examples, Table 5.17 shows the maximum 






Table 5.17: Maximum Torque Ratios for Viscous Braking, High Operating Speed 
Configuration Joint 1 Joint 2 Joint 3 Joint 4 Joint 5 Joint 6 
Twisted 0.77 7.38 2.31 3.20 0.81 2.14 
Out of Plane 9.74 1.21 1.25 3.48 0.80 0.30 
Extended 0.25 9.29 8.11 0.03 1.97 0.16 
Table 5.17 clearly shows that all torque values from the torque-based stopping 
trajectory are within limits, meaning that the system will theoretically be able to generate 
the trajectories, as opposed to the “Twisted” configuration trajectory with the ramped 
acceleration trajectory generator.  Operating in torque space gives the added benefit of 
being able to more easily control to allow the manipulator to operate within actuator 
torque limits.  However, this comes at the cost of a lesser ability to specify the desired 
safety parameters such as velocity and distance traveled, which occur in kinematic space.  
The relative magnitudes of the maximum torque ratios for the viscous braking scheme 
compared to the torque ratios from the kinematic control scheme are shown in Table 
5.18.  The values are normalized to the torque ratios in Table 5.12. 
Table 5.18: Relative Magnitudes of Maximum Torque Ratios for Viscous Braking 
Configuration Joint 1 Joint 2 Joint 3 Joint 4 Joint 5 Joint 6 
Twisted 0.33 0.51 0.24 0.79 0.22 0.62 
Out of Plane 1.29 0.19 0.27 1.50 0.63 0.18 
Extended 1.09 1.25 1.37 0.00 0.77 0.00 
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Somewhat unsurprisingly, in the configuration where multiple actuators are 
operating at greater torques with the viscous braking scheme, the performance is 
improved, indicating that a more aggressive torque-based trajectory generator that 
introduces a greater shock into the system may be able to improve some of the safety 
criteria at the added risk of damaging the manipulator. 
 Now that every case has been examined and simulated, the values of the safety 
criteria for all three stopping trajectory generators and every inertial load, speed condition 
and configuration described in previously in this chapter are shown in Table 5.19.  The 
corresponding maximum torque ratios for each joint and each trajectory generated are 
shown in Table 5.20.  To provide a point of comparison for how each individual case 
performs relative to a baseline, Table 5.21 shows the relative magnitude of the safety 
criteria for each of the cases.  These values have been normalized to the unloaded 
manipulator operating at a low speed in the “Out of Plane” configuration using the 






























500 23.86 19.10 14.25 0.115 0.005 
2000 94.30 64.50 68.75 0.202 0.066 
High 
500 27.87 21.80 17.38 0.168 0.007 
2000 106.53 68.90 81.21 0.231 0.076 
Out of Plane 
Low 
500 5.04 4.60 1.98 0.043 0.001 
2000 20.38 18.70 8.18 0.098 0.009 
High 
500 6.74 6.10 2.95 0.060 0.001 
200 27.31 24.20 12.17 0.130 0.013 
Extended 
Low 
500 11.85 5.80 10.32 0.130 0.002 
2000 46.80 20.90 41.87 0.220 0.017 
High 
500 13.37 6.80 11.53 0.152 0.002 





500 1.18 1.16 0.22 0.006 0.002 
2000 16.74 16.49 2.91 0.021 0.015 
High 
500 1.18 1.16 0.22 0.006 0.002 
2000 16.74 16.49 2.91 0.021 0.016 
Out of Plane 
Low 
500 1.10 1.10 0.03 0.005 0.001 
2000 15.98 15.97 0.54 0.016 0.010 
High 
500 1.10 1.10 0.03 0.005 0.001 
2000 15.98 15.97 0.54 0.016 0.010 
Extended 
Low 
500 4.37 3.09 3.09 0.013 0.002 
2000 63.37 38.22 50.55 0.048 0.040 
High 
500 4.37 3.09 3.09 0.013 0.002 





500 1.00 0.99 0.13 0.006 0.002 
2000 15.89 15.69 2.56 0.021 0.015 
High 
500 1.00 0.99 0.13 0.006 0.002 
2000 15.89 15.69 2.56 0.021 0.016 
Out of Plane 
Low 
500 0.93 0.93 0.02 0.005 0.001 
2000 14.96 14.95 0.55 0.017 0.010 
High 
500 0.93 0.93 0.02 0.005 0.001 
2000 14.96 14.95 0.55 0.017 0.011 
Extended 
Low 
500 4.20 2.80 3.13 0.013 0.002 
2000 62.78 37.27 50.52 0.048 0.040 
High 
500 4.20 2.80 3.13 0.013 0.002 















500 0.22 1.92 0.57 0.86 0.20 0.55 
2000 0.77 7.38 2.31 3.20 0.81 2.14 
High 
500 0.2 1.98 0.54 0.86 0.14 1.05 
2000 0.69 7.51 2.22 3.20 0.67 4.04 
Out of Plane 
Low 
500 2.45 0.46 0.26 0.87 0.20 0.07 
2000 9.74 1.21 1.25 3.48 0.80 0.30 
High 
500 2.45 0.58 0.22 0.85 0.11 0.14 
200 9.67 1.33 1.26 3.49 0.55 0.55 
Extended 
Low 
500 0.06 2.57 1.94 0.01 0.49 0.04 
2000 0.25 9.29 8.11 0.03 1.97 0.16 
High 
500 0.09 0.03 1.87 0.01 0.58 0.09 





500 2.28 13.64 9.16 4.03 3.46 3.35 
2000 2.29 13.90 9.25 3.94 3.62 3.37 
High 
500 1.70 14.63 10.84 4.06 3.85 11.8 
2000 1.72 14.97 10.75 3.97 3.97 11.8 
Out of Plane 
Low 
500 7.22 2.81 3.49 1.96 1.24 1.30 
2000 7.34 5.80 4.43 2.14 1.27 1.67 
High 
500 9.05 3.52 4.27 2.22 1.95 4.57 
2000 9.19 7.04 5.47 2.42 2.08 5.88 
Extended 
Low 
500 0.17 6.75 5.62 0.00 2.46 0.00 
2000 0.24 6.97 5.61 0.00 2.46 0.00 
High 
500 0.42 8.52 5.76 0.00 2.83 0.00 





500 2.28 14.33 9.71 4.01 3.65 3.29 
2000 2.35 14.35 9.57 4.04 3.69 3.43 
High 
500 1.72 15.36 11.33 4.04 4.08 11.6 
2000 1.78 15.43 11.05 4.07 4.06 12.0 
Out of Plane 
Low 
500 7.15 2.01 2.80 1.87 1.29 1.01 
2000 7.57 6.39 4.55 2.32 1.28 1.70 
High 
500 9.05 2.63 3.52 1.79 1.86 3.54 
2000 9.47 7.76 5.60 2.62 2.19 5.99 
Extended 
Low 
500 0.17 7.01 5.79 0.00 2.53 0.00 
2000 0.23 7.45 5.91 0.00 2.57 0.00 
High 
500 0.43 8.83 6.96 0.00 2.91 0.00 
























500 25.54 20.45 650.82 23.00 5.00 
2000 100.93 69.05 3139.15 40.40 66.00 
High 
500 29.83 23.34 793.51 33.60 7.00 
2000 114.02 73.76 3708.07 46.20 76.00 
Out of Plane 
Low 
500 5.40 4.92 90.23 8.60 1.00 
2000 21.82 20.02 373.58 19.60 9.00 
High 
500 7.21 6.53 134.72 12.00 1.00 
200 29.23 25.91 555.61 26.00 13.00 
Extended 
Low 
500 12.68 6.21 471.32 26.00 2.00 
2000 50.09 22.37 1911.87 44.00 17.00 
High 
500 14.31 7.28 526.27 30.40 2.00 





500 1.26 1.24 9.99 1.20 2.00 
2000 17.92 17.65 132.71 4.20 15.00 
High 
500 1.26 1.24 9.99 1.20 2.00 
2000 17.92 17.65 132.71 4.20 16.00 
Out of Plane 
Low 
500 1.18 1.18 1.32 1.00 1.00 
2000 17.11 17.10 24.82 3.20 10.00 
High 
500 1.18 1.18 1.32 1.00 1.00 
2000 17.11 17.10 24.82 3.20 10.00 
Extended 
Low 
500 4.68 3.31 140.96 2.60 2.00 
2000 67.83 40.92 2307.99 9.60 40.00 
High 
500 4.68 3.31 140.96 2.60 2.00 





500 1.07 1.07 6.01 1.20 2.00 
2000 17.01 16.79 117.11 4.20 15.00 
High 
500 1.07 1.07 6.01 1.20 2.00 
2000 17.01 16.79 117.11 4.20 16.00 
Out of Plane 
Low 
500 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2000 16.02 16.01 25.10 3.40 10.00 
High 
500 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2000 16.02 16.01 25.10 3.40 11.00 
Extended 
Low 
500 4.49 2.99 143.00 2.60 2.00 
2000 67.20 39.90 2307.07 9.60 40.00 
High 
500 4.49 2.99 143.00 2.60 2.00 





5.3 OPERATIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
Now that sufficient data has been gathered to make some early conclusions, the 
operator should consider some specific criteria to be more important depending upon the 
task that the manipulator will be performing.  First and most important, it is necessary to 
ensure that actuator faults will not occur during the stopping trajectory of the 
manipulator.  If an actuator fault were to occur during the stopping motion, unpredictable 
behavior will result in undesirable motion during a time when control of the manipulator 
is most critical.  As can be seen in the analysis from Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2, both a 
change in configuration and a high inertial load can push the actuators past their torque 
limits.  Therefore, if a kinematics-based controller is being used, the operator should take 
special care in the location of the manipulator within the workcell to ensure that the task 
does not involve moving through configurations where high torques would be required 
and that the motion parameters are sufficiently conservative that any additional end-
effector load will not cause an actuator fault. 
For tasks involving pHRI applications, the two most critical criteria are those that 
minimize the potential injury risk, specifically the kinetic energy and the end-effector 
velocity criteria.  These have been previously in the literature to be the most critical 
parameters in terms of the potential head injury and fracture forces generated by a 
collision, so these should be of greatest importance for safety tasks involving human 
interaction with the manipulator.  Additionally, as shown in Section 5.2.3, the operating 
speed of the manipulator has the greatest impact upon the manipulator’s ability to stop 
itself safely, so this parameter should be adjusted to provide the greatest potential benefits 
towards making the manipulator safer for humans to interact with.  
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For tasks which require a specific path, such as cutting or seam welding, the 
operator should seek to minimize the trajectory distance criterion.  In both of these tasks, 
there is a binary effect to being on the commanded trajectory versus traveling away from 
it.  Moving off of the trajectory may result in damage to the manipulator tool or the part 
being operated upon, which may cause damaging effects elsewhere in the system for 
large parts. 
At all times, the joint-level criteria such as the torque ratios should be monitored 
to indicate potential problems and sources of error within the system.  This will ensure 
safe operation and fewer unexpected hardware failures. 
5.4  CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter a 6DOF system was presented.  Simulations of the stopping 
trajectories for a wide variety of states and configurations were developed in order to 
gauge the relative impacts of that these factors will have upon the manipulator’s ability to 
stop itself safely. 
Finally, a conclusive summary of the data was shown, along with a set of 
recommendations to the future manipulator operator and/or designer for the relative 





Conclusion and Future Work 
This report presented a new framework to be used to evaluate a manipulator’s 
ability to halt itself safely and measure the system’s capability to do so.  This process 
relied on identifying the important operating parameters of manipulators, creating 
evaluator criteria based upon these parameters and determining how actuator parameters 
affect the ability of the manipulator to satisfy these criteria.  The key to this report is 
developing a simple framework of physically significant criteria to allow the operator or 
system designer to determine how safely a manipulator is able to halt itself in the event 
that the system requires intervention to prevent a hazard.  This allows the operator to 
simply assess the potential damages or injuries resulting from such an intervention and 
adjust the operating parameters to satisfy the task requirements.  From the design side, 
the actuator parameters of motor torque and gear reduction ratio were examined in order 
to allow the designer to make design choices to ensure that the manipulator meets the 
task specifications.  Furthermore, it was shown with a 6DOF industrial manipulator 
geometry example how different operation parameters will affect the ability of a 
manipulator to safely halt itself. 
In the next section, a summary of the key work presented in each of the preceding 
chapters is presented.  This includes the previous work done in the field of safety to both 
quantify and improve system safety, the evaluatory framework established in this work, 
and the relationship of actuator parameters to the performance capabilities of the system.  
The chapter concludes with a summary of the future work to be done to extend the 
research presented in this report. 
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6.1 RESEARCH SUMMARY 
In each of the subsections below, a summary of one of the previous chapters from 
this work is presented.  These are divided as follow: 1) Literature Review, 2) Safety 
Criteria Framework, 3) Effect of Actuator Parameters, and 4) Applications to Industrial 
Environments.  In the section about the literature review, the major works previously 
done in the field of safety are presented and summarized.  In the summary of the safety 
criteria framework, the criteria established in this work to evaluate manipulator safety 
and performance capacity are presented.  The section on the effect of actuator parameters 
explains the results mapping the actuator parameters to the safety criteria performance.  
Finally, the section about applications to industrial environments presents a design case 
study involving a manipulator geometry commonly found in industry. 
6.1.1 Previous Work 
In this work, a framework for evaluating a specific portion of the manipulator’s 
safety scheme is presented.  While this has not been specifically addressed in the 
literature, there is a substantial set of work done to both evaluate the overall safety of the 
manipulator and methodologies to improve on different aspects of the manipulator safety.  
In a report evaluating the safety of a manipulator, it is important to examine the entirety 
of the strategies being used to improve manipulator safety.  Chapter 2 presented and 
discussed four different approaches to evaluating and improving safety in manipulator 
systems.  A summary of these works along with some examples in the literature is 






Table 6.1: Summary of Safety Improvement Strategies 
Safety Improvement 
Technique 
Example technologies Areas addressed 
Improved Environmental 
Awareness 
Vision systems [Cervera et 
al], improved sensor fusion 
[Jeong and Takahashi] 




Hybrid actuators [Shin et 
al], selectively compliant 
joints [Rabindran], 
absorbent coverings [Ikuta 
et al] 




potential from manipulators 
Assessment of fracture 
forces, effect of manipulator 
collisions on HIC 
[Haddadin et al] 
Standardization of injury 
ratings, generating useful 
information about injuries 
Evaluation and optimal safe 
control 
Optimal braking strategies , 
real-time safety monitoring, 
[Kulic and Croft, Haddadin 
et al, Jeong and Takahashi] 
Improved safety during 
operation, faster hazard 
response 
The work being done in environmental awareness includes two separate camera 
systems.  The first camera system is a commercial product available intended to replace 
current safeguards preventing motion in manipulator workspaces such as light curtains 
and mechanical latches.  This is a step forward, but of limited interest in the field of 
safety research since the functionality is identical to that of existing systems. 
The second camera system uses a set of fixed fisheye cameras to provide real time 
information about the environment to the manipulator controller.  This allows the 
manipulator to react and adapt to moving objects within the manipulator workspace, 
including humans.  Cervera et al. were able to demonstrate the manipulator’s ability to 
react to a human entering the workspace and respond to the presence.  This work is of 
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greater interest to safe manipulation since there is a large body of work that has been 
done in the field of obstacle avoidance including establishing artificial potential fields 
and virtual force application that can be easily adapted to work with the information 
provided by these systems. 
 The second approach involves work being done to develop mechanically safer 
actuators and manipulators [Rabindran, Shin et al].  These include using inherently 
compliant pneumatic actuators combined with electric actuators to form a selectively 
compliant system along with the use of advanced gear trains and multiple actuators to 
remove disturbances from the system.  Also, Ikuta et al’s work investigates the effect of 
manipulator materials was estimated upon the safety of the manipulator’s operation with 
the specific case of absorbent materials directly addressed. 
 The third approach encompasses the work being done to adapt current injury 
criteria used in automobile safety standards to manipulators [Haddadin et al].  This work 
examines the potential for injury in both unconstrained and constrained, or clamped, 
blunt impacts.  These injury criteria include Head Impact Criterion (HIC), a metric based 
upon the resulting acceleration of the head after an impact to measure the lethality of a 
collision and the fracture force of the impact relative to the fracture force of the cranial 
and chest bones.  Table 6.2 shows the fracture effects of manipulators in constrained 
impacts. 
 This work also shows the importance of the end-effector velocity.  For 
unconstrained collisons, this is the most important criteria in terms of the potential HIC 
values.  While this relies on empirical results since the HIC is measured as a function of 
the resulting head acceleration from an impact, establishing a relationship between HIC 
and the manipulator state is important for establishing future safety standards. 
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Table 6.2: Impact Forces with clamping at 2 m/s for different manipulators [Haddadin 
et al, 2008] 
Robot Contact Force (kN) Maxilla Fracture? 
LWRIII 0.6 @ 1 m/s No 
LWRIII 1.2 @ 2 m/s Yes 
KR3 2.2 @ 2 m/s Yes 
KR6 (Cat0 & 1) 5.1 @ 2 m/s Yes 
KR500 (Cat0 & 1) 23.6 @ 2m/s Yes 
Robot Contact Force (kN) Frontal Fracture? 
LWRIII 3.5 @ 2 m/s No 
KR3 6.9 @ 2 m/s Yes 
KR6 (Cat0 & 1) 16.3 @ 2 m/s Yes 
KR500 (Cat0 & 1) 86.3 @ 2 m/s Yes 
The fourth approach involves evaluating the danger present in the standard 
operation of the manipulator and reactive control strategies.  These include the Danger 
Criterion (DC) and Danger Index (DI) used by Kulic and Croft, and the danger-index 
used by Ikuta et al.  In terms of the factors related to the manipulator control, all of these 
criteria depend mainly upon three factors: the distance between the manipulator and the 
obstacle, the velocity of the manipulator and the inertia of the manipulator, which directly 
maps to the kinetic energy present in the system. 
The optimal braking strategy demonstrated by the Dynamic Acceleration 
Polytope (DAP) is one such reactive method from the literature.  This algorithm involved 
the construction of a mapping between a hypercube in joint torque space bounded by the 
acceptable nominal joint torques and a polytope in joint acceleration space.  This allowed 
the operator to choose an optimal braking acceleration at the bounds of the polytope, and 
then invert the mapping, shown in Eq. 6.1 to determine the joint torque required to 
achieve this acceleration. 
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    ̂                (6.1) 
In order to establish the base framework for the mapping of actuator parameter 
values to the safety performance of the manipulator, the relationship between actuator 
parameters and the output capabilities needs to be examined.  This analytic mapping is 
presented in Section 2.2 of the work.  Specifically, the relationship of the actuator 
nominal torque and the gear reduction ratios to the effective inertia of the manipulator 
allows for the determination of the not only the energy present in the system, but also the 
responsiveness of the end-effector.  This mapping of the actuator parameters to the 
effective inertia of the system is shown in Eqs. 6.2 and 6.3. 
         ∑                           (6.2) 
  ,       (6.3) 
In Eq. 6.3,  and  refer to the translational and rotational g-functions for 
the center of gravity of the j-th axis.  To determine the responsiveness of the manipulator, 
however, the torque capabilities of each axis must also be taken into account.  The 
equivalent mapping of the end-effector’s acceleration capabilities is shown in Eq. 6.4 
    ∑
∑
         (6.4) 
Chapter 4 later adapts this work to estimate the safety performance of a 
manipulator given the actuator parameters. 
6.1.2 Safety Criteria 
6.1.2.1 System Level Criteria 
Based upon this previous research, this report develops a set of criteria in order to 
evaluate the ability of a manipulator to halt itself safely.  This is done to specifically 
address the gap in the work discussed in the previous section, which largely neglects 
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evaluation of the halting motion and focuses instead upon only the period before the 
hazard response is initiated, operating on the assumption that the manipulator is able to 
halt itself safely once a hazard is detected.  These criteria, presented in Section 3.1, assess 
both the likelihood of a collision between the manipulator and a hazard and the potential 
severity of a collision if it occurs.  A full description of the criteria is presented in Section 
3.1, but a short summary, along with a description of the physical meaning of each 
criterion is shown below in Table 6.3. 
Table 6.3: System level Safety Criteria 





Total distance traveled by 
the manipulator after 
receiving the stop 
command 
TDT→0, manipulator 
travels no distance 
TDT→∞, manipulator 






Distance traveled by the 
manipulator in the 
specified direction 
dDST→0, manipulator 
travels no distance in 
specified direction 
dDST→∞, manipulator 






Amount of kinetic energy 
present in the system at the 
end-effector 
EKE→0, manipulator 
energy quickly dissipates 
EKE→max, manipulator 
stores a large amount of 




Stiffness of the system at 
the end-effector 
STF→0, manipulator is 
in a configuration such 
that forces will cause 
deflection of the EEF 
STF→max, manipulator 




















Speed that the end-effector 
is moving at during the 
stopping trajectory. 
VEL→0, manipulator 
quickly decelerates to 
zero speed 
VEL→∞, manipulator 






Speed that the end-effector 
is moving in a specified 
direction during the 
stopping trajectory 
dVEL→0, manipulator 
quickly decelerates to 
zero speed in direction 
dVEL→∞, manipulator 






Distance that the end-
effector travels from a set 
trajectory defined by the 
operator 
TRJ→0, manipulator 
travels no distance away 
from trajectory 
TDT→∞, manipulator 
veers far away from 
trajectory 
While the distance criteria are primarily concerned with determining the 
probability of a collision, the criteria measuring the system stiffness and energy address 
the concept of determining the severity of a collision, should one occur.  The velocity-
based criteria combine the two concerns, addressing the previous work by Haddadin 
which demonstrated that the velocity of the manipulator at the point of a collision tends 
to be the greatest determinant of the resulting HIC if the manipulator collides with a 
human in its workspace. 
Additionally, the trajectory following criteria, TRJ, is formulated specifically to 
address certain applications where it is of primary importance to keep the manipulator on 
a set path, such as seam welding, where motion along the manipulator’s given path may 
be acceptable, but motion outside of this path may result in severe damage to the 
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manipulator, the part being machined, or tooling attached to the manipulator.  Another 
example of a task which may require the manipulator remain on a set trajectory would be 
a cutting, or sawing task.  Motion transverse to the cutting path may result in warping of 
the blade, requiring not only replacement of the tool, but also damage to the part being 
cut.  If this is part of a larger assembly, this may have more severe consequences as well. 
6.1.2.2 Joint Level Capability Criteria 
It is also vitally important for the manipulator and designer to know how close to 
the capacity the manipulator is operating during safety critical motions such as 
emergency stopping.  As actuators operate closer to their limits, the possibility of a 
hardware failure or damage to the system becomes greater.  If this happens it will lead to 
unpredictable behavior, which is inherently unsafe and therefore is not allowable in 
manipulator used in a safety-critical environment. 
To this end, a set of criteria to determine the performance of the manipulator at 
the joint and actuator level relative to its capacity are presented in this work.  This set of 
criteria allows the operator to not only determine whether to be concerned about potential 
faults, but also to assess the capability of the manipulator to improve upon its method of 
halting, whether through a more aggressive motion plan, an alternative torque algorithm, 
or improved control.  This allows for a potential set of “stopping” test requirements 
similar to what is seen in the automobile industry currently.  These criteria are presented 








Table 6.4: Joint Level Capacity Criteria 




Degree to which the 
actuators are performing at 
their capacity 
TRT→0, No actuator is 
near maxium capacity 
TRT→1, one or more 







concentration of the total 
kinetic energy in the 
system within any single 
joint 
KED→min, energy is 
evenly distributed 
throughout the joints 
KED→1, energy is 






The concentration of total 
kinetic energy in the 
system weighted by the 
joint’s maximum 
wKED→min, energy is 
evenly distributed 
throughout the joints 
EKE→1, one or more 







The total kinetic energy 
present in the joints of the 
manipulator 
JKE→0, no kinetic 
energy is present in the 
manipulator joints 
JKE→max, the 
manipulator is near its 





Amount of potential energy 
stored with the joints of the 
system 
JPE→0, joints contain no 
stored potential energy 
JPE→max, a large 
amount of potential 
energy is in the joints 
Of perhaps the greatest importance in this set of criteria is the torque ratio 
criterion.  This criterion requires the operator to specify a stopping coefficient, α, to 
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determine the magnitude to which the operator wishes to allow the actuators to exceed 
their nominal operating torque limits.  This in particular distinguishes stopping motions 
from the standard operation of the manipulator.  Because of the extremely low duty cycle 
and short duration of the stopping motion, it is possible to operate outside the standard 
torque limits of the actuators without overheating them or causing other mechanical 
faults.  While a standard value of three to five for the stopping coefficient should be 
considered acceptable to the operator without fear of damaging the actuators, it may be 
considered that damage to the actuators is more desirable than the results of a collision.  
If this is determined to be the case, a value of up to ten may be chosen for the stopping 
coefficient. 
Again, the importance of these criteria will vary according to the discretion of the 
operator, the manipulator design and the task given.  By monitoring these criteria in 
addition to the safety criteria described in the previous section during a stopping motion, 
the operator is able to gain a full understanding of the system functionality within the 
context of safety and manipulator capabilities. 
6.1.3 Safety Performance Estimation 
In order to assist the manipulator designer in creating a system which satisfies the 
task requirements for safe manipulator operation, it is important to be able to estimate the 
effects of design decisions upon the stopping performance of the manipulator.  This 
report addresses this problem in Chapter 4 using the mappings between the prime mover 
torques and gear reduction ratios to the system’s effective inertia and responsiveness 
from Section 2.2. 
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In order to account for the differences in stopping motion compared to standard 
operation of the manipulator, the effective acceleration defined in Eq. 6.4 is first modified 
to the form of Eq. 6.5. 
     
∑
            (6.5) 
In this equation, α is defined as the stopping coefficient chosen by the operator to 
determine the excess capacity of the actuator that the operator wishes to be used.  As 
described previously, due to the extremely low duty cycle of emergency stopping of the 
manipulator, the operator may deem it to be necessary to use between three and five and 
up to ten times the nominal torque of the manipulator in extreme cases.  While this would 
be infeasible during normal operation due to the damage potentially done to the 
manipulators, the infrequent nature of the stopping methods enables this expansion of 
torque capacities.  This stopping coefficient can be defined separately for all joints. 
First, the velocity criteria are examined.  This method uses an alternate 
formulation of the velocity criteria, namely, the time required to decelerate the 
manipulator to a safe end-effector speed.  This is done by assuming that each of the 
actuators is able to contribute to decelerating the end-effector, in addition to the constant 
acceleration assumption.  With the effective acceleration of the manipulator defined as in 
Eq. 6.5, it was shown that the velocity is described in Eq. 6.6 as in Section 4.1.2. 
                    (6.6) 
From Eq. 6.6, it can then be shown that the time to reach a safe velocity is easily 
solved for.  This solution is presented in Eq. 6.7. 
 
                      (6.7) 
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 This requires the determination of a safe velocity by the operator.  This can be 
done either through analysis of the potential for injury such as the work done with HIC 
and fracture forces, or else by setting it as the standard low speed used in teach pendant 
operation currently, defined as 250 mm/s in the current ANSI/RIA safety standard.  Since 
the acceleration in Eqs. 6.5 and 6.6 is defined as a function of the motor torques and gear 
ratios, the final equation represents a relationship between these base actuator parameters 
and the performance. 
 With the velocity determined, the distance criteria are examined.  This is more 
straightforward since the distance traveled by the manipulator can be directly calculated 
given the assumptions and requires no additional analysis to provide a useful metric to 
the designer.  This relationship, again in terms of the effective manipulator acceleration 
defined in Eq. 6.5, is shown in Eq. 6.8. 
                     (6.8) 
 As with the velocity criteria, the operator may wish to determine how far the 
manipulator travels until it reaches the designated safe speed in order to determine a 
radius of severe injury potential about the manipulator’s end-effector.  This distance is 
shown in Eq. 6.9. 
 
                    (6.9) 
 Finally, the relationship between the joint level criteria and the actuator 
parameters needs to be examined, as done in Section 4.2.  For the simple torque ratio it is 
straightforward to determine the mapping between the motor torque and torque ratio 







/              (6.10) 
 The mapping in general is fairly self-evident because as actuator parameters are 
adjusted, the operator will presumably update the control scheme to maximize the use of 
these parameters, resulting in a similar capability performance. 
 However, with the kinetic energy distribution criteria, the effects of differing the 
gear ratios on the individual joints will have an effect upon the energy distribution of the 
system since these gear ratios transmit the rotor inertia into joint space.  In order to 
investigate this effect, an empirical study was done with a 2DOF manipulator by varying 
the torque ratios on the first and second joint and generating surface plots of the resulting 


























Figure 6.2:  Effect of Gear Ratios upon Average Joint 2 Kinetic Energy Partition Value 
 
As can be seen from the two plots, the distribution values were largely decoupled 
in this study, but small effects upon the opposite joint’s gear ratio can still be seen, even 
in a 2 DOF manipulator.  This suggests that this is an effect that the designer should not 
want to neglect.  Given that the large gear ratios typically found in real world 
manipulators will greatly amplify the actuator inertias relative to other inertia in the 
system, the effects of varying the gear ratio should be of concern to the designer. 
6.1.4 Application to Industrial Environments 
In order to demonstrate the effects that operating conditions will have upon a 
manipulator geometry commonly found in industry, a set of simulations for PUMA-style 
159 
 
manipulator, shown in Figure 6.3 were conducted in this report.  This uses the framework 
presented in Chapter 3 to evaluate the relative effects of changes in the manipulator’s 
configuration, end-effector load, operating speed and stopping control scheme upon the 
safety criteria developed.  The full description of the manipulator, including actuator 
parameters and the inertial properties of the links can be found in Section 5.1. 
Figure 6.3: 6-DOF PUMA-Type Arm 
 
First, the effects of the initial configuration of the manipulator upon the safety 
criteria are evaluated.  This is to determine the relative ability of the manipulator to safely 
halt itself throughout its workspace.  Three different configurations were examined: a 
“Twisted” configuration in which the manipulator is oriented near its base, an “Out of 
Plane” configuration in which the manipulator is moving transverse to the standard plane 
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of motion, and an “Extended” configuration in which the manipulator is operating near 
the outer edges of its workspace.  A more complete description and illustrations of these 
configurations is shown in Section 5.2.1.  Figure 6.4 shows a plot of the distance traveled 
by the end-effector during the stopping motion for each configuration. 
Figure 6.4: Distance Traveled in Various Initial Configurations 
 
 As can be seen in the plot, the initial configuration of the manipulator may have a 
potentially large effect upon the distance traveled by the end-effector.  .  In order to 
analytically compare the effects that the configuration has on the full set of the safety 
criteria, Tables 6.5 and 6.6 show the values of the safety criteria and their relative 
magnitudes for each configuration.  The raw data used is also available in Section 5.2.1. 
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Time to “Safe” 
Kinetic Energy 
(s) 
Twisted 1.0036 0.9949 0.1316 0.006 0.002 
Out of Plane 0.9343 0.9341 0.0219 0.005 0.001 
Extended 4.198 2.7955 3.1318 0.013 0.002 














Time to “Safe” 
Kinetic Energy 
(s) 
Twisted 1.07 1.07 6.01 1.20 2.00 
Out of Plane 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Extended 4.49 2.99 143.00 2.60 2.00 
 However, in order to determine the manipulator’s ability to execute the trajectory, 
it is likewise important to monitor the maximum torque ratio of each actuator during the 
stopping trajectory.  As can be seen from Table 6.7, when in the “Twisted” configuration, 
the torque required at actuator two far exceeds even the largest torque limits of the 
manipulator, meaning that the configuration of the manipulator has a large effect on the 
torque requirements for a stopping trajectory. 
Table 6.7: Maximum Joint Torque Ratios for Different Configurations 
Configuration Joint 1 Joint 2 Joint 3 Joint 4 Joint 5 Joint 6 
Twisted 2.28 14.33 9.71 4.01 3.65 3.29 
Out of Plane 7.15 2.01 2.80 1.87 1.29 1.01 
Extended 0.17 7.01 5.79 0.00 2.53 0.00 
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 Next, the effects of the inertial loading at the end-effector are examined by adding 
a 500 mm long steel bar to the robot gripper.  Because a kinematics-based motion plan is 
used, this shows no effect upon the motion criteria for a motion parameter plan, but 
demonstrated a slightly harmful effect to the kinetic energy stored in the manipulator 
during the trajectory.  As described in Section 5.2.2, the relative inertia of the bar is still 
dwarfed by the inertia of the lower joint actuators due to the amplification effects of the 
gear train, so the total kinetic energy of the system is not greatly affected by the end-
effector load.   
   However, because of the much smaller gear train of the sixth joint and its 
proximity to the added load, the inertial load of the steel bar significantly increases the 
required torque for the sixth actuator, more than tripling it for the two configurations 
which required acceleration of the sixth joint.  Table 6.8 shows the relative magnitudes of 
the torque ratios for the loaded manipulator as compared to the unloaded case based on 
the data from Section 5.2.2.  The slight increases in the torque requirements for joints 2 
and 3 are also important to note.  Because of this amplification, if the actuators are 
operating near their limits in an unloaded case, the addition of a load may push them 
beyond acceptable torque limits. 
Table 6.8: Relative Magnitudes of Maximum Torque Ratios for Inertial Load 
Configuration Joint 1 Joint 2 Joint 3 Joint 4 Joint 5 Joint 6 
Twisted 0.75 1.07 1.17 1.01 1.12 3.53 
Out of Plane 1.27 1.31 1.26 0.96 1.44 3.50 
Extended 2.53 1.26 1.20 0.00 1.15 0.00 
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Next, the effects of changes in the Cartesian operating speed are assessed.  This is 
of special importance given that the main requirement under the current ANSI/RIA safety 
standard to operate a manipulator with a human inside the workspace is the limiting of a 
manipulator’s operating speed to 250 mm/s.  Additionally, work previously described in 
this chapter has demonstrated that speed may be the greatest determinant of injury in the 
case of a collision. 
Simulations involving the manipulator at high speeds showed a marked worsening 
in all safety criteria.  Much greater than the effect of the configuration or the effect of 
loading the manipulator, the speed has a pronounced effect upon the manipulator’s ability 
to halt itself.  Figure 6.5 shows a plot to compare performance of the manipulator at low 














Figure 6.5: Total Distance Traveled at Different Operating Speeds 
 
 The numerical results of the safety criteria and their relative magnitudes of the 
safety criteria are presented in Tables 6.9 and 6.10.   The values are normalized to the low 
speed performance for each configuration and show a clear worsening in safety 
performance, indicating that the operating speed is potentially the single greatest 
determinant of a manipulator’s ability to halt itself in a safe manner.  Thus, if the operator 
needs to quickly improve the safety of a system, the easiest way to accomplish this is by 





















Time to “Safe” 
Kinetic Energy 
(s) 
Twisted 15.89 15.69 2.56 0.02 0.02 
Out of Plane 14.96 14.95 0.55 0.02 0.01 
Extended 62.78 37.27 50.52 0.05 0.04 














Time to “Safe” 
Kinetic Energy 
(s) 
Twisted 15.84 15.77 19.49 3.50 7.50 
Out of Plane 16.02 16.01 25.10 3.40 10.00 
Extended 14.96 13.33 16.13 3.69 20.00 
 Finally, the effects of using a torque-based control scheme to generate the 
stopping trajectory are examined.  As shown in Figures 6.6 and 6.7, this offered potential 
gains and losses depending on the manipulator state.  The advantages of using a viscous 
braking method were shown to be an assurance that torque limits will not be crossed and 
potentially enhanced performance in high speed operations.  However, this comes at the 
cost of more unpredictable motion plan, and without an optimized system, worse 
performance.  Table 6.11 shows the relative magnitudes of the safety criteria for the 
torque-based algorithm normalized to the kinematic-based algorithm.  As can be seen in 
the values from the table, the performance is clearly worse, except in the “Extended” 
configuration, demonstrating the somewhat unpredictable nature of using an non-


















Time to “Safe” 
Kinetic Energy 
(s) 
Twisted 23.78 19.20 108.31 19.17 2.50 
Out of Plane 5.40 4.92 90.23 8.60 1.00 
Extended 2.82 2.07 3.30 10.00 1.00 







Figure 6.7: Comparison of Stopping Controls for Extended, High Speed Configuration 
 
6.2 FUTURE WORK 
The work in Chapters 3 and 4 outlines a framework for assessing the 
manipulator’s safety but there remains a large body of work to be done in the application 




6.2.1 Injury Criteria 
The current set of safety criteria includes no direct analogue in terms of the 
potential for human injury in the event of a collision.  This would involve integrating and 
advancing the work done assessing manipulator collisions in terms of the fracture forces 
and HIC.  Incorporating criteria involving a form of these metrics will allow for a greater 
physical meaning to the operator.  It also allows the risk to be clearly laid out to potential 
recipients of medical care from manipulator based systems. 
Bringing this degree of clarity to the safety evaluation is vitally important to 
removing manipulators from the highly constrained environment in which they currently 
operate and moving them into use by the common consumer.  However, there still 
remains no consistent mapping of manipulator state at the point of impact to the 
commonly accepted injury metrics.  These are determined through empirical testing 
which, while useful for assessing some of the maximum injury possibilities, does not 
allow for any degree of control optimization.  When a method for determining these 
injury risks can be used in real time, these metrics will become much more useful and 
effective within the greater framework. 
6.2.2 Decision Making 
This report has mainly focused upon the development of an evaluation 
framework.  In order to expand upon this work, the framework should be applied in a 
control scheme in order to optimize the manipulator’s stopping motion according to some 
combination of the criteria.  This expands the work from being a mere measurement of a 




There has been a large amount of work done in decision making strategies at the 
Robotics Research Group at the University of Texas-Austin in order to optimize the joint 
configuration in redundant manipulators [7, 30].  These include an adaptation of direct-
search algorithm by Hooper and Tesar [31].  While the previous work adapted the 
optimization strategy for use in a highly constrained situation, the general algorithm 
remains expandable to be used in the highly unconstrained trajectory decision making 
problem as well. 
A simpler expansion into the control problem would be an evaluation of the 
different stopping schemes according to the criteria presented here.  These strategies 
include the DAP and those presented by Haddadin et al.  This would allow for an 
objective measure of the efficacy of the various schemes, some of which are optimized 
according to the author’s own metric.  However, an independent framework to evaluate 
these halting methods would allow the operator a clear choice between stopping 
strategies in order to optimize according to the appropriate criteria given the manipulator 
task. 
6.3 CONCLUSIONS 
This report presented a framework for the evaluation of the safety of stopping 
trajectories in serial manipulators.  First, an overview of joint motion control plans was 
discussed to provide a background for control strategies.  Next, a summary of the 
previous work done in improving manipulator safety was presented.  Based on this work, 
a set of criteria were developed in order to assess the motion of a manipulator during its 
halting trajectory.  These were developed according to the safety concerns demonstrated 
previously.  Another set of criteria in order measure the system’s level of capacity to do 
work and measure the potential for failures at the joint and actuator level was developed 
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as well.  As the research into mapping human injuries to manipulator parameters becomes 
more fully developed, these criteria could be added to.  Finally, a methodology for 
mapping some of the safety criteria to the actuator parameters was provided in order to 
allow the designer to estimate the performance of a manipulator during the stopping 
motion without requiring assembly of the manipulator and performance tests.  The 
methodology was then simulated over a full 6DOF industrial-type manipulator.  As 
actuator design for low duty cycle, high demand stopping (α > 5) improves, the potential 
to move past the values determined in Chapter 5 will expand greatly.  
Finally, in this chapter the previous work was summarized and related to the work 
presented in this report.  A set of possibilities for future work was presented as well.  
These include not only incorporating the injury metrics from the automobile industry into 
future development of safety criteria, but also the expansion of this work into the control 
field and optimal control.  There already exists a set of stopping methodologies which 
could be empirically evaluated and compared using the framework presented here.  
Integrating this work into all of these avenues allows for exciting possibilities in the 






A. Denavit-Hartenberg Parameters for 6-DOF PUMA Arm 
Link ai-1 (m) αi-1 (deg) di (m) Φi
1 0 0 0 Φ1 
2 0 -90 0.125 Φ2
3 0.4 0 0 Φ3
4 0 -90 0.35 Φ4
5 0 90 0 Φ5
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